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CABLE COMPANY MONOPOLY: COMCAST AND
TIME WARNER CONTROL THE BOARD
I. INTRODUCTION
Cable television subscribers can simply look at their cable bills or
search for competitive providers in their local communities to discover
what lawmakers have known for years-prices are going up, and choices
are few and far between.1
Unfortunately, while Congress has been debating telecommunications
reform, Comcast Corporation and Time Warner Cable Inc. have
monopolized the cable industry-often with Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) approval.2 Empowered by sweeping deregulation in
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Telecom Act),3 the multimedia
giants pushed small competitors (dubbed "overbuilders") out of the cable
market and raised prices to artificially high levels.
4
The Telecom Act effectively left the cable industry in control of itself
through deregulation 5 and entrusted the over-politicized and under-staffed
FCC with industry oversight. Congress ordered the FCC to provide
reliable data and prescribe regulations for the cable industry.6 However,
the regulatory branch has consistently failed to implement statutorily
mandated provisions, creating a perpetual quagmire of government
1. E.g., In re Implementation of Section 3 of the Cable Television Consumer Prot. &
Competition Act of 1992, Report on Cable Indus. Prices, 21 F.C.C.R. 15087, 15120 (rel. Dec. 27,
2006) [hereinafter Report on Cable Indus. Prices] (statement of Chairman Kevin J. Martin).
2. See discussion infra Parts II.C, IV.B-E.
3. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (2000)).
4. See Third Amended Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act
at 23, Behrend v. Comcast Corp., No. 03-6604 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 2006), 2006 WL 1760198.
5. See COMMON CAUSE EDUC. FUND, ASK YOURSELF WHY... CABLE RATES GOT SO
HIGH 1 (2006) [hereinafter ASK YOURSELF WHY] ("[The Telecom] Act freed the cable industry
from nearly all curbs on rate hikes... [and] lifted all regulation on rates for non-basic cable
service, effective immediately for most small cable systems, and for all cable companies by
1999.").
6. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
385, § 19, 106 Stat. 1460, 1496-97.
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inaction.7 Unfortunately, as soon as Congress passed the Telecom Act, the
same groups that supported the legislation sued to dismantle its provisions
and appealed to lawmakers to relax the rules even more.8 "Between 1991
and 2006 major cable industry interests and their trade groups spent more
than $105 million on campaign contributions... and on lobbying in
Washington. '9 During the same time-period, the FCC contradicted its own
findings, reversed its direction, and generally favored industry
consolidation. Although news of Comcast's earnings in 2006 exceeded the
expectations of Wall Street analysts, cable subscribers were not likely to be
so pleasantly surprised. 0
It is now well established that the Telecom Act failed to achieve its
goals 1 to promote competition and secure lower prices for cable
subscribers.12  In its annual Report on Cable Industry Prices, the FCC
found that cable rates increased ninety-three percent overall since Congress
enacted the Telecom Act. 13 Furthermore, in 2006, the cost of basic cable
service increased by an annual rate of six percent-more than twice the rate
of inflation. 
14
Section 601 of the Telecom Act provides that the law "shall [not] be
construed to modify, impair, or supersede the applicability of any of the
antitrust laws. 1 5 Nevertheless, the FCC recently approved the acquisition
of Adelphia Communications Corporation (Adelphia) by Comcast and
Time Warner-the nation's two largest cable television companies1 6 -in
apparent violation of the Sherman1 7 and Clayton18 Antitrust Acts (Sherman
7. See discussion infra Parts 1I.B, III.A.
8. See CELIA VIGGO WEXLER, COMMON CAUSE EDUC. FUND, THE FALLOUT FROM THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 8 (2005).
9. ASK YOURSELF WHY, supra note 5, at 1.
10. See Mike Farrell, Comcast Exceeds Expectations-Even the Company's Own: From
Wall Street to Main Street, Cable Giants Deliver on All Fronts, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Sep. 25,
2006, at 4A, available at http://www.multichannel.com/article/CA6374506.html.
11. See Charles B. Goldfarb, Telecommunications Act: Competition, Innovation, and
Reform, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, Order Code RL33034, at CRS-i (2005), available at
http://www.benton.org/benton files/CRSTelecom%20Act.pdf.
12. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, pmbl., 110 Stat. 56, 56.
13. Report on Cable Indus. Prices, supra note 1, at 15093.
14. See id. at 15087.
15. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 601(b)(1), 110 Stat. at 143 (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 152 note (2000)).
16. See National Cable & Telecommunications Association Top 25 MSOs,
http://www.ncta.com/ContentView.aspx?contentld=73 (2007) (last visited Feb. 23, 2008)
(reporting that there were 24,156,000 Comcast subscribers and 13,308,000 Time Warner
subscribers as of Sept. 2007).
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2000). Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act provides that "[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
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Act and Clayton Act, respectively).
The Telecom Act's detrimental effect on cable subscribers and
potential competitors is well illustrated in the pleadings of two recent cases
filed against Comcast' 9 and Time Warner ° for their alleged violations of
21antitrust laws. In Behrend v. Comcast Corp., class members claimed,
inter alia, that Comcast and Time Warner "imposed unreasonable,
horizontal market restraints" 22 through a "series of transactions in which
they.., acquired competitors and then 'swapped' customers in one
geographic area for customers in another, thereby 'clustering' their cable
systems in particular regions., 2 3 The swapping practices in major-market
cities such as Philadelphia, Chicago, Boston,2 4 and Minneapolis created
local monopolies that "undermine the ability of potential competitors to
establish competing cable systems. ' '25 In America Channel v. Time Warner
Cable, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants, Time Warner and Comcast,
"simultaneously engaged in persistent and extensive discrimination against
independent programming networks and have instead favored and carried
only programming networks in which they have either a complete or partial
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id. § 1.
Section 2 provides that "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fime not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation,
or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court." Id. § 2.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000). The Clayton Act provides that "No person engaged in
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or
any part of the stock or other share capital ... where in any line of commerce or in any activity
affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." Id.
19. See Third Amended Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Sherman Antitrust
Act, supra note 4, at 1.
20. First Amended Complaint at 1, 5, Am. Channel, LLC v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., No.
06-CV-2175-DWF/AJB (D. Minn. Feb. 5, 2007), 2007 WL 412518. Comcast was also a
defendant in this case.
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2000).
22. Third Amended Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act,
supra note 4, at 27.
23. Id. at 2.
24. See Behrend v. Comcast Corp., Nos. 03-6604, 07-218, 07-219, slip op. at 5 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 1, 2007), available at 2007 WL 2221415 ("Comcast agreed to swap its Chicago-area
subscribers for AT & T Broadband's Philadelphia-area subscribers, removing AT & T Broadband
from the Philadelphia market and Comcast from the Chicago market .... This conduct, along
with Comcast's later acquisition of AT & T Broadband itself, also makes plausible the claims
alleging.., that Comcast monopolized and attempted to monopolize the Philadelphia, Chicago
and Boston markets.").
25. First Amended Complaint, supra note 20, at 8-9.
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ownership interest., 26 Additionally, through their alleged anticompetitive
acts, the cable companies caused prices for cable television services to be
artificially high.27
In Behrend and America Channel, the primary issue in significant
pre-trial actions was whether the plaintiffs satisfied the redefined pleading
standard for Sherman Act violations set forth by the United States Supreme
Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.28 In Bell Atlantic, the Court held
that a plaintiff can survive a motion to dismiss only by pleading enough
factual matter to suggest that the challenged anticompetitive conduct
stemmed from a contract or conspiracy.29 If there are sufficient factual
bases in the pleadings to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will
reveal evidence of an illegal agreement based on a showing of parallel
business behavior, the court shall find plausible grounds to infer an
agreement between the defendants.3°
The National Cable and Telecommunications Association (NCTA),
the cable industry's principal trade group, argues that FCC-imposed
horizontal ownership caps are unwarranted because Direct Broadcast
Satellite (DBS) providers have become well-established proven
competitors. 31  Furthermore, incumbent telephone companies such as
Verizon Communications Inc. (Verizon) and AT&T Inc. have an advantage
over traditional cable companies because they can market their "triple-play
services" (voice, video and data) to a larger customer base.32 On the other
hand, consumer groups, such as the Common Cause Education Fund,33
challenge the notion that there is any real competition in the cable industry,
noting that "[r]oughly 98 percent of the households with access to cable are
served by only one cable company. 34 Furthermore, ninety percent of the
top fifty cable networks are owned by the same parent companies that own
the broadcast television networks.35
26. Id. at 13.
27. See Third Amended Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Sherman Antitrust
Act, supra note 4, at 23.
28. 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Letter from Daniel L. Brenner, Senior Vice President, Law & Regulatory Policy,
NCTA, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC 5 (Mar. 16, 2007), available at
http://www.ncta.com/IssueBrief.aspx?contentld=3054.
32. Id.
33. The Common Cause Education fund "seeks to promote open, honest and accountable
government through research, public education and innovative programs." WEXLER, supra note
8, at2.
34. Id. at 11-12.
35. Id. at 12.
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This Article will address how the Telecom Act has adversely affected
competition and raised prices in the cable industry through unprecedented
industry consolidation and market swapping. Despite several attempts by
the 109th Congress to address telecommunications reform-such as the
Communications, Opportunity, Promotion, and Enhancement Act of 2006
(COPE Act) 36 -the session adjourned without legislative resolution.
37
Additionally, the 110th Congress has largely ignored telecommunications
reform to date, instead focusing on issues that drove voters to the polls in
the 2006 midterm elections.38
Part II of this Article discusses the legislative history of cable
regulation beginning in 1984, the goals of the Telecom Act, and the details
of post-Telecom Act mergers and acquisitions in the cable industry. Part
III examines the current state of competition and prices in the cable
industry.39  Part IV of this Article analyzes: (1) the FCC-approved
acquisition of Adelphia by Comcast and Time Warner as a violation of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts; (2) recent antitrust claims against the cable
giants; and (3) the pleading standard now required for plaintiffs alleging
antitrust violations after the Supreme Court ruling in Bell Atlantic.40 Part V
concludes that the 10th Congress needs to revisit telecommunications
reform in order to curb the flow of costly antitrust litigation. However, in
order to fill the void with meaningful legislation, Part V suggests imposing
a luxury tax on the cable giants as an alternative to traditional rate
regulation.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Pre-Telecom Act Regulation
Over the last quarter-century, cable regulation has ebbed and flowed
along with political and economic developments. Concerns about
competition and choice have dominated the ongoing debate. Throughout,
36. Communications, Opportunity, Promotion, and Enhancement Act of 2006, H.R. 5252,
109th Cong. (as passed by House, June 8, 2006).
37. See Ted Heam, Democrats in Charge but Not Threatening: Telecom Policy Not Likely
to Be on Capitol Radar, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Nov. 13, 2006, at 6, available at
http://www.multichannel.com/article/CA6390451 .html.
38. Id.
39. Part III highlights a 2003 Government Accounting Office Report. U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: ISSUES RELATED TO COMPETITION AND
SUBSCRIBER RATES IN THE CABLE TELEVISION INDUSTRY 1 (2003) [hereinafter GAO].
40. 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
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Congress and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) have been
unable to determine the level of market concentration at which cable
companies should be regulated.
Historically, the government has regulated cable operators like local
telephone companies because they are both classified as "common
carriers., 41 Furthermore, the government often regulates common carriers
under the same principles as public utilities (such as gas, water and power)
because both markets operate as "natural monopolies., 42  Natural
monopolies exist where "the entire demand within a relevant market can be
satisfied at lowest cost by one firm rather than by two or more. 43 If the
market contains more than one company, the industry often consolidates
through mergers and failures. 4 Under natural monopoly conditions "the
benefits, and indeed the very possibility, of competition are limited., 45
Cable service, unlike other natural monopolies, generally involves some
level of consumer choice because entertainment and information are not
single commodities like electricity or gas. Therefore, the FCC must
consider whether cable subscribers should have options among providers
and channels when it determines the appropriate level of cable regulation.
1. The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
In 1984, Congress passed the first comprehensive national legislation
establishing guidelines and franchise procedures for the cable industry.
46
The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (Cable Act), which
amended the Communications Act of 1934 (Communications Act),47
deregulated the cable industry in order to promote competition and
"minimize unnecessary regulation that would impose an undue economic
burden on cable systems., 48  The Cable Act granted the FCC express
jurisdiction49 and power to prescribe rules and regulations with respect to
41. See Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548,
548-49 (1969) ("Common carriers" include "providers of public transportation and
telecommunications.").
42. See id. at 548.
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. Omega Satellite Products Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126 (7th Cir. 1982).
46. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 2, 98 Stat. 2779,
2780 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 521 (2000)).
47. 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (2000).
48. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 § 2, 98 Stat. at 2780 (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 521(6) (2000)).
49. Id. § 3(a)(l), 98 Stat. at 2801 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 152 (2000)).
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ownership and control of cable systems.50
Congress created a safeguard against monopolization through its so-
called "70-70 rule," which gave the FCC power to promulgate any
additional rules to ensure diversity of information sources.5' If seventy
percent of American homes have access to cable systems with thirty-six
channels or more, and seventy percent of those households actually
subscribe to those systems, the FCC is authorized to regulate the cable
52industry to ensure diversity.
Cable franchising is primarily a local issue because franchises
generally arise when municipalities grant rights-of-way for cable lines in
exchange for a license fee.53 Section 2 of the Cable Act provides, with
some exceptions, that "a cable operator may not provide cable service
without a franchise. 54 A cable operator may obtain such a franchise from
a "franchising authority," which is defined as "any governmental entity
empowered by Federal, State, or local law to grant a franchise. 55 Once
issued a franchise, a cable operator is authorized to construct cable systems
"over public rights-of-way, and through easements., 56
2. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992
In response to increasing cable rates brought about by the Cable Act,
Congress re-regulated the cable industry through the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (Cable Act of 1992). 7
In Section 2 of the Cable Act of 1992, Congress reported that between
1986 and 1992, "[m]onthly rates for the lowest priced basic cable
service... increased by 40 percent or more for 28 percent of cable
television subscribers * . . almost three times as much as the Consumer
Price Index.",58  Furthermore, the cable industry became highly
concentrated. 59 As a result, most subscribers had no opportunity to select
50. Id. § 2, 98 Stat. at 2785 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 201 (2000)).
51. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 2, 98 Stat. 2779,
2784-85 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 532(g) (2000)).
52. See id. (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 532(g) (2000)).
53. See id. at 2786-87 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 541, 542(a) (2000)).
54. Id. at 2786 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 541(b)(1) (2000)).
55. Id. at 2781 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 522(10) (2000)).
56. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 2, 98 Stat. 2779,
2786 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2) (2000)).
57. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, § 3(a), 106 Stat. 1460, 1464 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 543(a) (2000)).
58. Id. § 2(a), 106 Stat. at 1460 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 521 note (2000)).
59. Id. (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 521 note (2000)).
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between competing cable systems.60  Additionally, industry leaders often
created barriers to market entry for new programmers.6'
The Cable Act of 1992 requires the FCC to establish regulations
ensuring reasonable rates for basic cable service where the service is not
subject to "effective competition. 62  Conversely, a cable service that is
subject to "effective competition" continues to avoid FCC rate regulation.63
In order to determine whether a cable system is subject to "effective
competition," the FCC calculates the number of households that subscribe
to services from all "multichannel video programming distributors"
(MVPDs), including Direct Broadcast Satellite service providers.
64
Through the Cable Act of 1992, Congress also granted the FCC authority to
regulate any unreasonable rates for upper tiers of service.65 Such tiers
include "bundles" or groups of popular cable networks such as CNN and
ESPN, as well as premium pay channels such as HBO and Showtime.66
Section 7(a) of the Cable Act of 1992 prevents a franchising authority
from granting an exclusive cable franchise and from unreasonably refusing
to award an additional competitive franchise.67 Additionally, in awarding a
franchise, the franchising authority must allow overbuilders "a reasonable
period of time to become capable of providing cable service to all
60. See id. (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 521 note (2000)).
61. See id.
62. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, § 3(a), 106 Stat. 1460, 1464 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 543(a)(2) (2000)).
63. See id. (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 543(a)(2) (2000)). As of 2006, 3.4% of nationwide
communities having cable systems were subject to the statutory classification of "effective
competition." See Report on Cable Indus. Prices, supra note 1, at 15102 (percentage computed
by dividing 1,128 communities relieved from regulation by 32,930 total cable communities).
64. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, § 3(a), 106
Stat. 1464, 1470-71 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 543(a)(2), (1) (2000)). From 1992 until 1996, a
finding of "effective competition" in a franchise area meant only that one of the following
conditions existed: (1) less than thirty percent of the households in the franchise area subscribed
to cable service (low-penetration test); (2) at least two unaffiliated companies offered comparable
video programming service to fifty percent or more of the households in the franchise area, and at
least fifteen percent did not subscribe to service from the largest company (competitive provider
test); or (3) the franchising authority offered video programming services to at least fifty percent
of the households in the franchise area (municipal test). However, beginning in 1996 and still in
effect in 2008 "effective competition" can also mean that: (4) a company offers video
programming (by means other than Direct Broadcast Satellite) that is comparable to programming
offered by a cable provider in the franchise area (local exchange carrier test). 47 C.F.R.
§ 76.905(b) (2006).
65. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, § 3(a), 106
Stat. at 1464, 1468 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 543(a)(2)(B), (c) (2000)).
66. See GAO, supra note 39, at 8.
67. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, § 7(a), 106 Stat. 1460, 1483 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2000)).
CABLE COMPANY MONOPOLY
households in the franchise area.",68 However, the franchising authority
may require adequate assurance that the cable operator is financially,
technically and legally qualified to provide cable service and that it will
provide adequate public, educational and governmental channel access.
69
3. Politics Behind the Telecommunications Act of 1996
In 1994, Congress once again took up telecommunications reform.7°
The Democratic-controlled House passed a telecommunications reform bill
by a landslide margin (423 to 4), but the bill did not include many of the
deregulatory measures included in the Communications Act of 1996
(Telecom Act).71 The Senate proposed similar legislation, but the bill
never came to a vote, largely due to opposition by Minority Leader Bob
Dole, a Republican from Kansas.72
Under the leadership of House Speaker Newt Gingrich, a Republican
from Georgia, Republicans re-introduced telecom reform in 1995 after
gaining control of the House.73 However, the 1995 versions of the Telecom
Act proposed sweeping deregulation of the industry.74 Due to efforts of
House Democrats and President Bill Clinton's threatened veto, Congress
eventually amended the Telecom Act in order to strengthen FCC oversight
of media mergers.75
B. The Goals of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
In February 1996, President Clinton signed the Telecom Act, which
deregulated competition and prices in all areas of the telecommunications
industry, including radio, local telephone, broadcast television, and cable
television.76  The Telecom Act amended the Communications Act, the
Cable Act, and the Cable Act of 1992. 77 Congress voted in favor of the Act
68. See id. § 7(b), 106 Stat. at 1483 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(4)(A) (2000)).
69. See id. (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(4)(B)--(C) (2000)).
70. See WEXLER, supra note 8, at 9.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1995, S. 652, 104th
Cong. (amended 1996); see also Edmund L. Andrews, House Panel Acts to Loosen Limits on
Media Industry, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1995, at Al (The Senate's bill was similar to the House's
bill, "though the House measure [was] more hawkishly deregulatory.").
75. See WEXLER, supra note 8, at 9.
76. See id. at 5, 7.
77. 47 U.S.C. § 151 etseq. (2000).
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by margins of 91 to 5 in the Senate,78 and 414 to 16 in the House. 9 Certain
provisions of the Telecom Act went into immediate effect, while the FCC
continues to implement other sections through promulgation of its rules and
regulations.8 °
Congress' express purpose for the Telecom Act was "to promote
competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and
higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and
encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications
technologies., 81  Legislators forecasted that the Act would create 3.4
million jobs and save consumers $550 billion over the next ten years,
including $78 billion in lower cable bills.82
Through the Telecom Act, Congress ordered the FCC to review its
ownership rules biennially to determine whether the rules remain necessary
to protect the public interest.83 The Telecom Act also empowered the FCC
to "repeal or modify any regulation [that] it determines to be no longer in
the public interest" as a result of meaningful competition.84 In 2004,
Congress amended the Telecom Act to require quadrennial ownership
reviews because biennial evaluations resulted in an endless review
process.
85
Supporters of the Telecom Act argued that the Act would enable
telecommunications competitors to enter markets that were previously
restricted under the cross-ownership regulations in the Cable Act of 1992;
and that it would also provide significant competition for traditional cable
systems. 86 In order to facilitate telephone companies' expansion into the
78. U.S. Senate, U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 104th Congress-2nd Session, On the
Conference Report (S.652 Conference Report) (1996),
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll call-lists/roll-callvotecfm.cfmncongress=104&sess
ion-2&vote=00008 (yeas 91, nays 5, not voting 3).
79. OFFICE OF THE CLERK, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FINAL VOTE RESULTS FOR
ROLL CALL 25 (1996), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1996/rolI025.xml (yeas 414, nays 16, not voting
4).
80. See, e.g., In re Implementation of Cable Act Reform Provisions of the Telecomms. Act
of 1996, Order & Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 5937 (rel. Apr. 9, 1996)
[hereinafter Order & Notice of Proposed Rulemaking].
81. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, pmbl., 110 Stat. 56, 56.
82. See 142 CONG. REC. S687, S703-S704 (1996) (statements of Senators Domanici and
Ford, citing a study conducted by the Wharton Econometrics Forecasting Association at the
Wharton School of Business regarding potential full competition in telecommunications).
83. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(h), 110 Stat. at 111-12.
84. Id.
85. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629(3), 118 Stat. 3, 100
(2004) (amending the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110 Stat.
56, 111).
86. See WEXLER, supra note 8, at 11.
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video deployment market, Section 302 of the Telecom Act repealed the
Cable Act of 1992's telephone company restrictions.87  Therefore,
telephone companies can now provide video programming to subscribers in
their telephone service areas.88
The Telecom Act permitted local exchange carriers to become
certified as "open video system" (OVS) providers rather than "cable
service" providers, thereby qualifying them to bypass the franchise
approval process typically required for cable operators. 89 The Act also set
forth a new "effective competition" test 90 that applies to telephone
companies seeking franchises under the new OVS provision.
91
Congress directed the FCC to prescribe open video system regulations
within the six months after the Telecom Act's enactment. 92 However, the
FCC struggled to implement an adequate OVS framework without
conflicting with state laws.93  Even though the Telecom Act allows
telephone companies to bypass the local franchise approval process through
OVS certification, some states still require local exchange carriers to apply
for franchise licenses. The Telecom Act's plain language expressly forbids
FCC regulations that conflict with state law.94  Thus, certain OVS
provisions were successfully challenged in the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1999.95 The court held that the FCC "exceeded its statutory
authority in exempting OVS operators from local franchise
requirements. 96 Eventually, the FCC amended several of its rules in order
to comply with the Fifth Circuit decision.
97
87. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 302(a), 110 Stat. 56, 118-
19 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 571 (2000)).
88. See id. (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 571 (2000)).
89. See id. at 121-22 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 573(a)(1) (2000)).
90. See id. § 301(b) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 543(1)(1) (2000)) (applies in franchise areas
where a company offers video programming, by means other than Direct Broadcast Satellite, that
is comparable to programming offered by a cable provider in the franchise area).
91. See id. § 302(a) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 571, 573(c) (2000)).
92. See id. § 302(a), 110 Stat. 56, 123 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 573(b)(1) (2000)).
93. See generally Norman M. Sinel et al., Recent Developments in Cable Law, 889
PRACTISING L. INST. 9, 78-85 (2007) (describing the FCC's open video system framework
implementation process and successful court challenges).
94. See City of Dallas v. FCC, 165 F.3d 341, 347 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Section 601(c)(1)
of the Communications Act of 1934 (codified as amended by Section 601 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 at 47 U.S.C. § 152 note (2000) (stating that the Telecom Act
"shall not be construed to modify, impair, or supersede Federal, State, or local law")).
95. See id. at 359-60.
96. Id. at 347.
97. See In re Implementation of Section 302 of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, Open Video
Syss., Order on Remand, 14 F.C.C.R. 19700 (rel. Nov. 19, 1999) (codified as amended at 47
C.F.R. § 76.1501, 76.1502-03 (2006)).
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C. Post Telecom Act Cable Industry Mergers and Acquisitions
Freed from pre-Telecom Act regulatory constraints, Comcast acquired
several cable service operators between 1996 and 2002, gaining millions of
new subscribers.9 8 Concurrently, AT&T Corporation (AT&T), Comcast's
most significant competitor at the time, acquired several cable operators
(dubbed "multiple cable system operators" or "MSOs"). 99 The FCC
approved cable system swaps between Comcast, AT&T, and Adelphia in
Florida, Indiana, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and
Washington, D.C.--consolidating several regional clusters."0  On
November 18, 2002, the FCC approved a merger between AT&T and
Comcast, which consolidated both cable businesses into Comcast. 10 As a
result of the merger, Comcast acquired AT&T's cable systems and more
than thirteen million AT&T cable subscribers.
10 2
Between July 2004 and June 2005, the cable industry announced a
total of twenty-two transactions valued at approximately $48.7 billion.,
0 3
Together, these transactions further consolidated regional clusters and
affected almost thirteen million subscribers.10 4 As of July 2006, Comcast
also held attributable ownership interests in nine national video
programming networks, eight regional sports networks (RSNs) and three
team-specific sports networks. 0 5  In addition to cable systems, Time
Warner owned several other media businesses, including "online
interactive services, filmed entertainment, television networks, and
98. See, e.g., Comcast, Comcast Timeline: A Look at Our History,
http://www.comcast.com/corporate/about/pressroom/corporateoverview/comcasttimeline/comcast
timeline.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2008) [hereinafter Comcast Timeline].
99. See Third Amended Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Sherman Antitrust
Act, supra note 4, at 17-19.
100. See Comcast Timeline, supra note 98.
101. See In re Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses from
Comcast Corp. & AT&T Corp., Transferors, to AT&T Comcast Corp., Transferee, Memorandum
Opinion & Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 23246, 23249-50 (rel. Nov. 14, 2002).
102. See id. at 23250.
103. See In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the
Delivery of Video Programming, Twelfth Annual Report, 21 F.C.C.R. 2503, 2509 (rel. Mar. 3,
2006) [hereinafter Twelfth Annual Report].
104. See id.
105. See In re Applications for Consent to the Assignment and/or Transfer of Control of
Licenses: Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., Assignors, to Time Warner Cable Inc., Assignees;
Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., Assignors & Transferors, to Comcast Corp., Assignees &
Transferees; Comcast Corp., Transferor, to Time Warner Inc., Transferee; & Time Warner Inc.,
Transferor, to Comcast Corp., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion & Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 8203,
8209-10 (rel. July 21, 2006) [hereinafter Memorandum Opinion & Order].
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publishing."'10 6 Time Warner also owns several RSNs.1
0 7
On July 13, 2006, by a four to one vote, the FCC approved the
roughly $17 billion acquisition of Adelphia by Time Warner and
Comcast.10 8  The FCC consented to the assignment or transfer of
Adelphia's assets, which were under bankruptcy court supervision, for a
total exchange of $12.7 billion in cash and the remainder in publicly traded
stock.'0 9 The FCC also ordered Comcast to divest its 17.9% equity interest
in Time Warner Cable and its 4.7% limited partnership interest in Time
Warner Entertainment. 10
The FCC placed several explicit conditions on its approval of the
acquisition."' However, Comcast and Time Warner have yet to certify
total compliance, despite several extensions. 12 The lone dissenter in the
FCC's vote, Democratic Commissioner Michael J. Copps, concluded that
the total effect of the transactions was unmistakable: "Big Media" got
bigger, and consumers were left holding the bag.' 13
In their applications to acquire the assets of Adelphia (formerly the
fifth largest MSO), Time Warner and Comcast also proposed to swap other
cable systems between themselves"14 -a per se violation of antitrust
laws. 15 Pursuant to FCC approval, Time Warner received Comcast
systems located in Los Angeles, Cleveland, and Dallas, while Comcast
received Time Warner cable systems serving portions of Philadelphia and
former Adelphia systems located in seventeen states. 16 As a result of the
106. Id. at 8210.
107. See id. at 8211.
108. See FCC Approves Purchase by Comcast and Time Warner, WALL ST. J., July i4,
2006, at A7.
109. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 105, at 8206-07.
110. See id. at 8213.
111. See id. at 8233.
112. See In re Applications for Consent to the Assignment and/or Transfer of Control of
Licenses: Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., Assignors, to Time Warner Cable Inc., Assignees;
Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., Assignors & Transferors, to Comcast Corp., Assignees &
Transferees; Comcast Corp., Transferor, to Time Warner Inc., Transferee; & Time Warner Inc.,
Transferor, to Comcast Corp., Transferee, Order Granting Additional Request for Further
Extension of Time, 22 F.C.C.R. 16939, 16940-41 (rel. Sep. 19, 2007) [hereinafter Order Granting
Further Extension of Timel.
113. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 105, at 8366 (dissenting statement of
Michael J. Copps).
114. See id. at 8212-13.
115. See Third Amended Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Sherman Antitrust
Act, supra note 4, at 4, 26.
116. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 105, at 8212-13 (listing California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Maryland, North Carolina,
New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, Vermont, Washington, and West
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system swaps, Time Warner gained approximately 2.2 million subscribers
from Comeast, and transferred approximately 2 million subscribers to
Comcast." 7 Comcast, already the nation's largest cable operator, was
expected to grow to 26.8 million subscribers after the merger. 18 Time
Warner was expected to become the second largest MSO, growing to 16.6
million subscribers. 19
III. CONGRESS NEEDS To AMEND THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF
1996
In 2003, John McCain, a Republican from Arizona and the Chairman
of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, asked
the Government Accounting Office (GAO) to investigate why cable rates
were still rising.120 In his inquiry, Senator McCain noted: "Either cable is
regulated or there is meaningful competition. And so far there doesn't
seem to be real meaningful competition." 121 In response, the GAO agreed
to: (1) examine the impact of competition in the cable industry; (2) assess
the reliability of the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC) annual
cable rate report and its "effective competition" classification; (3) examine
causes of cable rate increases; (4) assess whether vertical ownership of
cable networks such as CNN and ESPN indirectly affects cable rates; (5)
discuss why cable operators sell channels in tiers, rather than letting
customers subscribe to channels, "A la carte"; and (6) discuss options to
address cable rate increases. 
122
The GAO acknowledged that regulation has become significantly
more complex since Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996
(Telecom Act). 123 The marketplace continues to evolve and expand so
rapidly that every time the FCC tries to refresh the record with additional
comments, the data it collects becomes stale before rules can be adopted.
24
Today, video providers use a wide array of platforms to transmit various
Virginia).
117. See id.
118. See id. at 8206.
119. See id.
120. See ASK YOURSELF WHY, supra note 5, at 2.
121. See id.
122. See GAO, supra note 39 at 1, 3 (using "data on cable network revenues and
programming expenses that [it] acquired from Kagan World Media, which is a private
communications research firm that specializes in cable industry data").
123. See id. at 40.
124. See Letter from Daniel L. Brenner, supra note 31, at 1.
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communications services.12 5 The development of innovative technologies
has raised the issue of whether these new services fall within the current
statutory definition of "cable service. ,126  Regulators, therefore, must
contemplate which services and providers to regulate.
127
A. The Impact of Competition in the Cable Industry
Congress designed the Telecom Act, in part, to foster the expansion
of Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) service and to remove historical
barriers for telephone companies wishing to enter the video distribution
market. 128  Growing availability of satellite service has positively
influenced cable rates. 129 Specifically, cable rates are fifteen percent lower
in communities where multiple cable system operators (MSOs) compete
with satellite companies. 130  Furthermore, cable operators often provide
more channel choices, more discounts, and higher quality services in order
to compete with satellite companies.' 3' Yet, in 2002, the FCC and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) denied a proposed merger between satellite
providers DirecTV, Inc. and EchoStar Communications Corp., despite the
widely held belief that the merger could have established an even stronger
competitor against cable giants Comcast and Time Warner.' 32  Although
fighting the effects of cable mergers with greater consolidation may not be
an ideal solution, at least the proposed transaction would have been
consistent with other FCC-approved mergers.1
33
Existing competition in the cable industry, while strong in isolated
areas, is generally weak because small overbuilders and telephone
companies have not significantly expanded their market share as the
Telecom Act drafters predicted. 34 Local franchise authorities often impose
125. See GAO, supra note 39, at 40.
126. See Sinel et al., supra note 93, at 210; see also 47 U.S.C. § 522(6) (2000) ("[Tlhe term
,cable service' means-(A) the one-way transmission to subscribers of (i) video programming, or
(ii) other programming service, and (B) subscriber interaction, if any, which is required for the
selection or use of such video programming or other programming service.").
127. See GAO, supra note 39, at 40.
128. See WEXLER, supra note 8, at 11.
129. See Twelfth Annual Report, supra note 103, at 2506; see also GAO, supra note 39, at
10.
130. See GAO, supra note 39, at 3.
131. See id. at I.
132. See ASK YOURSELF WHY, supra note 5, at 2.
133. See id. (In 2006, the FCC allowed a $17.6 billion merger in which Time Warner and
Comcast absorbed the cable operations of Adelphia Communications Corp., despite the cable
companies' increasing monopolies); see also discussion, supra Part II.C.
134. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 105, at 8239.
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cost-prohibitive conditions for new entrants into the market, making it
difficult for overbuilders to effectively compete with media giants.
135
Furthermore, competition from telephone companies has been erratic, often
halting expansion or discontinuing service soon after entrance into the
market. 136 Citing a 2002 FCC video competition report, the GAO noted
that the four largest telephone companies largely abandoned the cable
industry.
137
However, telephone companies are finally beginning to positively
impact the video market's competitive landscape.138 Several local
exchange carriers are building fiber networks that will carry "triple-play"
services (voice, video, and data). 139  For instance, "Verizon began test
marketing its television product, FiOS TV, in 2004."' 140 It is now available
in at least 500 communities in twelve states. 141 In those areas where FiOS
TV is offered, incumbent cable companies have lowered rates anywhere
from twenty-eight to forty-two percent.142 Unfortunately, Verizon reported
that it will take at least five years to build fiber-optic infrastructure in just
fifty percent of its telephone coverage area. 43  Furthermore, AT&T's
triple-play offering, U-Verse, has grown at an even slower rate than FiOS
TV. 144  U-Verse is currently available in only a handful of markets.
1 45
Although Congress intended to create competition through the Telecom
Act, it is likely that two decades will have elapsed before the telephone
companies' triple-play services legitimately rival incumbent cable systems.
Section 11 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992 (Cable Act of 1992) required the FCC to
135. See In re Implementation of Section 621(a)(1) of the Cable Commc'ns Policy Act of
1984 as Amended by the Cable Television Consumer Prot. & Competition Act of 1992, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 18581, 18585 (rel. Nov. 18, 2005) [hereinafter Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking].
136. See GAO, supra note 39, at 1.
137. See id. at 10 (citing In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the
Market for Delivery of Video Programming, Ninth Annual Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 26901, 26904
(rel. Dec. 31, 2002)).
138. See Sinel et al., supra note 93, at 23.
139. Michael Learmonth, Slow Growth Dings Cabler, DAILY VARIETY, Oct. 26, 2007, at 5.
140. See Sinel et al., supra note 93, at 17.
141. See Press Release, Verizon Communications Inc., Verizon Seeks to Expand
Availability of FiOS TV Service in North Texas (Oct. 11, 2007), available at Media Newswire
Press Release Distribution, http://media-newswire.com/release_1055892.html (last visited Feb.
16, 2008).
142. See Sinel et al., supra note 93, at 23.
143. See Farrell, supra note 10, at 4A.
144. See id.
145. See id.
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prescribe rules and regulations establishing reasonable "horizontal
limits"-the maximum number of subscribers a cable operator is
authorized to reach through its cable systems. 146  The FCC was to take
particular account of the market structure and ownership patterns,
especially where cable systems and video programmers were jointly
owned. 47 In 1993, the FCC imposed a thirty percent horizontal limit on
the number of subscribers a cable system could serve. 48 Six years later the
rule was amended, defining the relevant market to include all multichannel
video programming distributor subscribers, including DBS customers.1
49
Time Warner and AT&T challenged the horizontal limit in federal
court, arguing that the regulation was in excess of the FCC's statutory
authority. 50 The court found that "the promotion of the diversity in ideas
and speech," and "the preservation of competition" both qualified as
important governmental interests in support of horizontal limits."'5 Yet, the
court reversed and remanded the regulation because the FCC did not
present substantial evidence of anticompetitive behavior or any evidence
that collusion between the cable operators had occurred or was likely to
occur. 1 2 The court did not vacate the FCC's rules. 153 Nevertheless, the
FCC was unable to comply with the court's directives, citing the difficulty
in "ascertain[ing] how hypothetical market conditions might affect
competition and diversity.
'' 54
After failed attempts in 2001 and 2003 to amend its ownership rules
pursuant to the Cable Act of 1992, the FCC issued its Second Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in 2005, seeking to update the record based
146. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, § 1 l(f), 106 Stat. 1460, 1487 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 533(f)(1)(A) (2000)).
147. See id. at 1488 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 533(f)(2)(C)) (2000)).
148. See In re Implementation of Sections 11 & 13 of the Cable Television Consumer Prot.
& Competition Act of 1992 Horizontal and Vertical Ownership Limits, Second Report & Order, 8
F.C.C.R. 8565, 8567 (rel. Oct. 22, 1993) [hereinafter Second Report & Order].
149. See In re Implementation of Section 1 (c) of the Cable Television Consumer Prot. and
Competition Act of 1992 Horizontal Ownership Limits, Third Report & Order, 14 F.C.C.R.
19098, 19101 (rel. Oct. 20, 1999); see also 47 C.F.R. § 76.503(a) (2005) (The category "MVPD
subscribers" includes consumers that subscribe to cable service and customers that subscribe to
Direct Broadcast Satellite service.).
150. See Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
151. Id. at 1130 (quoting Time Warner Entm't Co. v. U.S., 211 F.3d 1313, 1319 (D.C. Cir.
2000); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994)).
152. See id. at 1130-33.
153. See id. at 1144.
154. See In re the Comm'n's Cable Horizontal and Vertical Ownership Limits, Second
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 9374, 9384 (rel. May 17, 2005).
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on evidence submitted by interested parties. 55 Over an eighteen month
period ending in 2007, the FCC held six public hearings across the country
to address media ownership issues, and spent almost $700,000 on ten
independent studies.' 56  As 2007 drew to a close, the media ownership
debate became especially contentious and politically divisive as opposition
grew in the wake of News Corp.'s acquisition of The Wall Street Journal
and the sale of Tribune Co.' 57 FCC Democrats and consumer groups urged
Republican FCC Chairman Kevin J. Martin to complete newspaper
ownership studies on localism before rushing to a vote. 58 Additionally, a
large bipartisan group in the Senate introduced eleventh-hour legislation in
a futile attempt to delay the FCC. 159 Days before the FCC's scheduled
vote, Representative John Dingell, a Democrat from Michigan and
Chairman of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, called
Chairman Martin (and other FCC commissioners) to testify and respond to
tough criticism before a telecommunications panel, wherein Congressman
Dingell referred to the FCC as "broken."' 160  However, Chairman Martin
rejected the proposed delay and pushed ahead, noting that the issue was
"ripe for decision."' 161
Finally, on December 18, 2007, Chairman Martin concluded "that it
won't ever be possible to ... reach consensus on the media ownership
issue, ' 162 and ended the six year ownership evaluation process by casting
two separate deciding votes.' 63 In one vote, Chairman Martin joined fellow
Republicans and relaxed the newspaper-broadcaster cross-ownership ban to
pave the way for the Tribune Co. and Wall Street Journal acquisitions.
164
In another vote, the Chairman oddly joined FCC Democrats and re-
instituted the same thirty percent horizontal cable ownership cap that was
155. See id. at 9385.
156. See Press Release, FCC, Press Statement of Chairman Kevin J. Martin, at 1-2 (Dec.
18, 2007) (on file with FCC), available at http://www.fcc.gov/kjml21807-ownership.pdf
[hereinafter Martin Press Release].
157. See id. at 4.
158. See Jim Puzzanghera, Media Vote May Be Delayed, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2007, at C2.
159. See Jim Puzzanghera, Panel Sends Message on FCC Vote, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2007,
at C3.
160. See William Triplett, House Hearing Puts Martin on Hot Seat: FCC Chair Martin
Gets Big Grilling, DAILY VARIETY, Dec. 6, 2007, at 35.
161. See Martin Press Release, supra note 156, at 6.
162. Id.
163. See Stephen Labaton, F.C.C. Reshapes Rules Limiting Media Industry, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 2007, at Al.
164. See id.; see also Press Release, FCC, FCC Adopts Revision to Newspaper/Broadcast
Cross-Ownership Rule (Dec. 18, 2007) (on file with FCC), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs~public/attachmatch/DOC-278932A I .pdf.
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remanded by the D.C. Circuit Court in 2001.165 The FCC's Fourth Report
and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking attempts to comply
with the 2001 Circuit Court ruling by providing adequate justification for
the horizontal cap. 166  However, Republican dissenters Deborah Taylor
Tate and Robert McDowell both argued against the cap, noting that the
marketplace changed dramatically since the 2001 ruling, including satellite
television's growth from eighteen to thirty percent.' 67 House Commerce
Committee's senior Republican, Representative Joe Barton from Texas,
1 68
was baffled by Chairman Martin's votes, noting the inconsistency in
"eliminat[ing] regulations for some segments of industry because of
increased competition and at the very same time refus[ing] to deregulate or
even impos[ing] more regulation on segments of industry that are creating
that very competition."
' 169
After six years of ownership review, the FCC wasted significant
valuable tax dollars by reinstituting the thirty percent cap because the issue
returned to where it started-federal court. 70  Comcast, which (according
to current data) is just under the thirty percent limit, appealed the FCC's
ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in March
165. See Press Release, FCC, FCC Adopts Rules to Promote Video Programming Diversity
by Ensuring New Video Programmers Can Enter and Compete in Video Market: Order Will
Increase Diversity in Programming and Choices for Consumers (Dec. 18, 2007) (on file with
FCC), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs public/attachmatch/DOC-279038A1.pdf; see
also Labaton, supra note 163, at Al.
166. See In re The Comm'n's Cable Horizontal & Vertical Ownership Limits;
Implementation of Section 11 of the Cable Television Consumer Prot. & Competition Act of
1992; Implementation of Cable Act Reform Provisions of the Telecomms. Act of 1996; Review
of the Comm'n's Regulations Governing Attribution of Broad. & Cable/MDS Interests; Review
of the Comm'n's Regulations & Policies Affecting Inv. in the Broad. Indus.; Reexamination of
the Comm'n's Cross-Interest Policy, Fourth Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, MM Docket No. 92-264, CS Docket No. 98-82, CS Docket No. 96-85, MM Docket
No. 94-150, MM Docket No. 92-51, MM Docket No. 87-154, FCC 07-219, at 88 (rel. Feb. 11,
2008) (statement of Chairman Kevin J. Martin), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/FCC-07-219A I .pdf.
167. See Ted Heam, FCC Adopts 30% Cable Ownership Cap: Move Stops Comcast from
Acquiring More Cable Systems, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Dec. 18, 2007,
http://www.multichannel.com/article/CA6513846.html.
168. Rep. Joe Barton, a Republican from Texas, sponsored the House COPE Act in 2006.
See GovTrack.us, H.R. 5252 [109th]: Advanced Telecommunications and Opportunities Reform
Act, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bilI.xpd?bill=h 1 09-5252&page-command=print (last
visited Feb. 16, 2008).
169. Brooks Boliek, Hill Pot Shots Hit FCC 'On-Ramp': Dems' Barrage on Ownership
Change Targets Martin, HOLLYWOOD REP., Dec. 6, 2007, at 39.
170. See Ted Heam, Comcast Appeals FCC's 30% Cable Cap: Ruling Will Impact Cable
Giant's Long-Term Broadband, Voice Strategy, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Mar. 12, 2008, available
at http://www.multichannel.com/article/CA6540488.html.
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2008.171
The events of December 2007 strongly illustrated that Congress needs
to amend the Telecom Act. However, as theorized by Judge Richard A.
Posner, the FCC should consider alternatives to ownership regulation such
as collecting a "luxury tax" from cable operators who rise above a pre-
determined market share, rather than continuing to waste tax dollars on
years of circular evaluation and review.
171
B. The FCC's Data Is Unreliable
In 2003, the GAO determined that data in the FCC's annual cable rate
report 173 was unreliable. 174 By randomly sampling and evaluating 100 of
approximately 750 cable operators that responded to the FCC's 2002 cable
rate survey, the GAO discovered several concerns. 175  For instance, the
respondents were often confused by the survey and did not answer
consistently; important cost factors may not have been reflected in the
FCC's data; and the number of franchises designated under the "effective
competition" classification did not accurately reflect actual competitive
conditions.
1 76
Under the Telecom Act, local franchising authorities may not regulate
cable rates where cable operators are subject to effective competition.
1 77
Thus, "[a] franchise should not simultaneously be listed as facing effective
competition and having regulation of basic rates. 178 However, "of 262
franchises in [the] FCC's survey classified as facing effective competition,
40 [cable operators] also reported that the franchising authority regulated
their basic service rates.' 179 Therefore, "the lack of reliable information in
[the] FCC's cable rate report" compromises Congress' capacity to make
171. See id.
172. See Posner, supra note 41, at 639-40 (discussing the use of a tax as a possible
alternative to traditional natural monopoly regulation); see also infra Part V.
173. See In re Implementation of Section 3 of the Cable Television Consumer Prot. &
Competition Act of 1992, Report on Cable Indus. Prices, 17 F.C.C.R. 6301 (rel. Apr. 4, 2002).
174. See GAO, supra note 39, at 2.
175. See id. at 13-18.
176. See id
177. See id. at 17; see also 47 U.S.C. § 543(l)(1) (2000) (defining "effective competition").
Through implementation of Telecom Act provisions, the FCC placed a burden on cable operators
to petition for determination of "effective competition" status. Order & Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, supra note 80, at 5944; Order on Reconsideration, 17 F.C.C.R. 7609, 7624 (rel. Apr.
22, 2002); see also 47 C.F.R. § 76.906 (2006) ("In the absence of a demonstration to the contrary,
cable systems are presumed not to be subject to effective competition.").
178. GAO, supra note 39, at 17.
179. Id.
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crucial policy decisions. 80
Andrew S. Fishel, Managing Director of the FCC, officially replied to
the GAO report and justified the FCC's questionable data by explaining
shortcomings in the statutory framework. 81 Mr. Fishel also cited the lack
of resources necessary for the FCC to monitor the entire cable industry and
update designations of effective competition on a rolling basis.' 82
C. Causes of Cable Rate Increases
Cable operators cite several key factors to justify increasing rates for
their services. The GAO acknowledged the high costs associated with
updating infrastructure to enable new technologies, such as digital channels
and broadband Internet access, and the rising cost of programming.
83
According to industry sources, the cable industry spent $100 billion
between 1996 and 2005 upgrading its infrastructure by installing digital
equipment and replacing degraded coaxial cable with fiber-optics.'
84
Furthermore, some cable industry executives cited the rising prices of
broadcasting rights for sports programming and existing syndicated
programming.'85 However, one expert noted that higher costs associated
with advanced service upgrades do not justify higher rates for those
customers who only subscribe to basic cable services. 186 This is especially
true in light of cable operators' successes in offsetting higher costs with
additional local advertising revenue.
87
Under current FCC rules that require cable operators to obtain
individual franchise agreements, overbuilders argue that negotiation with
local governments can take as long as three years. 88 Furthermore, the
agreements are often filled with prohibitive conditions. 89  Overbuilders
may have to spend several years and millions of dollars to build
infrastructure without bringing in any revenue. 190 By the time municipal
180. See id. at 19.
181. See id. at 71 (Letter from Andrew S. Fishel, Managing Director, FCC, to Mark
Goldstein, Acting Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, GAO (Sept. 24, 2003)).
182. See id. at 71-73 (Letter from Andrew S. Fishel, Managing Director, FCC, to Mark
Goldstein, Acting Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, GAO (Sept. 24, 2003)).
183. See id. at 20.
184. See Twelfth Annual Report, supra note 103, at 2524.
185. See GAO, supra note 39, at 23.
186. See id. at 25-26.
187. See id. at 24.
188. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 135, at 18584-85 (citing Comments of
BellSouth Corp., et al., MB Docket No. 05-255, at 3).
189. See id. (citing Comments of Alcatel, MB Docket No. 05-255, at 19).
190. See id. (citing Comments of the Broadcast Service Providers Ass'n, MB Docket No.
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conditions have been satisfied by wiring entire communities, the
technology may be out of date.191 Conversely, large media companies such
as Comcast and Time Warner are able to absorb upgrade costs over a
longer period of time.'
92
Several states recently passed legislation to replace the traditional
municipal process with a streamlined state registration. 93 Texas was the
first state to pass a statewide franchising law in September 2005.94 Since
then, a number of states passed similar legislation, including California,
Indiana, Kansas, New Jersey, North Carolina and South Carolina.
195
Virginia passed legislation that requires local jurisdictions to impose equal
reqvtirements on franchise fees.
196
The 109th Congress introduced several bills in order to address
franchising issues in the cable industry, such as the Communications,
Opportunity, Promotion, and Enhancement Act of 2006 (COPE Act).
197
The COPE Act, which passed the House with overwhelming majority
support, 198 attempted to foster competition through a streamlined national
franchising process. 199 The COPE Act also proposed to significantly
redefine the term "cable service" for the first time since 1984.200 The
Senate version of the COPE Act, the Advanced Telecommunications and
20Opportunities Reform Act, °' was placed, on the Senate Legislative
05-255, at 19).
191. See id. at 18585.
192. See id. at 18584-85 (citing Comments of the Broadcast Service Providers Ass'n, MB
Docket No. 05-255, at 19).
193. See Sinel et al., supra note 93, at 211.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. Communications, Opportunity, Promotion, and Enhancement Act of 2006, H.R. 5252,
109th Cong. (as passed by House, June 8, 2006).
198. See OFFICE OF THE CLERK, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FINAL VOTE RESULTS
FOR ROLL CALL 241 (June 8, 2006), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2006/rol1241.xml (yeas 321, nays
101, not voting 11).
199. See H.R. 5252, § 101.
200. See id. § 102 (proposing to add, inter alia, to the definition of cable service the
following: "the transmission to subscribers of video programming or other programming service
provided through wireline facilities located at least in part in the public rights-of-way, without
regard to delivery technology, including Internet protocol technology, except to the extent that
such video programming or other programming service is provided as part of... a commercial
mobile service ... or ... an Internet access service.").
201. See Press Release, United States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, &
Transportation (June 28, 2006),
http://commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cftnFuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease-i
d=248635 (combined the House COPE Act and the Senate Communications, Consumer's Choice,
and Broadband Deployment Act of 2006).
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Calendar for consideration on September 29, 2006,202 but never came to a
vote.2 °3 After a power shift in the November 2006 General Election, 0 4 bill
co-sponsor Senator Ted Stevens, a Republican from Alaska, was unable to
assemble the sixty votes needed to overcome a filibuster.20 5
Given the local nature of cable service, Congress' national franchising
provisions are better left in theory. Furthermore, proposed reliance on
further FCC oversight seems counter-productive given the FCC's inability
to fulfill its existing obligations.
D. The Effect of Vertical Integration on Cable Rates
Industry representatives and experts argue that two primary
relationships affect the cost of cable programming: (1) "relationships
between cable networks and cable operators, 20 6 and (2) "relationships
between cable networks and [television] broadcasters. 20 7  In 1992, the
FCC asked Congress to repeal the vertical "network-cable cross-ownership
rule, 20 8 which was originally promulgated in 1970 "to curb network
dominance of the video marketplace and to protect the cable industry in its
incipient stage of development. 2 0 9  The FCC reported that the vertical
limitation no longer served the public interest two decades after the rule
went into effect.2 10  Moreover, networks' vertical integration with cable
systems serves the public interest "by encouraging the development of
202. See GPO Access, A Service of the U.S. Government Printing Office, Senate of the
United States, 109th Congress, Calendar of Business, Final Issue, No. 652, at 61,
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/calendars/dailysenate/2006/scl8de.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2008).
203. See GovTrack.us, H.R. 5252 [109th]: Advanced Telecommunications and
Opportunities Reform Act, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h1O9-5252&page-
command=print (last visited Feb. 16, 2008).
204. See Carl Hulse, Democrats Weigh New Power as Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2006,
at A26.
205. See, e.g., Susan Fratkin, policy@edu: The I 10th Congress: An Eye to the Past and the
Future, EDUCAUSE REV., Jan./Feb. 2007, at 70-71.
206. GAO, supra note 39, at 27.
207. Id.
208. 47 C.F.R. § 76.501(a)(1) (2002) (repealed by 68 Fed. Reg. 13,236-01 (2003))
(originally enacted as 47 C.F.R. § 74.1131 (1970)) ("[n]o cable television system (including all
parties under common control) shall carry the signal of any television broadcasting station if such
system directly or indirectly owns, operates, controls, or has an interest in a TV broadcast
station.").
209. See In re Amendment of Part 76, Subpart J, Section 76.501 of the Commission's Rules
& Regulations to Eliminate the Prohibition on Common Ownership of Cable Television Sys. &
National Television Networks, Report & Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 6156, 6157 (rel. July 17, 1992)
[hereinafter Report & Order], aff'd on recon., Memorandum Opinion & Order, 8 F.C.C.R. 1184,
1185 (rel. Feb. 23, 1993).
210. See id. at 6168.
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additional cable programming."
21 1
Section 202 of the Telecom Act permits "a person or entity to own or
control a network of broadcast stations and a cable system, ' 212 thereby
comporting with the FCC's 1992 request to repeal the vertical network-
cable cross-ownership rule.213 Time Warner currently owns and operates
several cable networks, such as TBS, TNT, Cartoon Network, CNN, and
HBO.2 14  Comcast also owns and operates several cable networks,
including E! Entertainment Television, The Style Network, and The Golf
Channel.21 5 Consumer groups argue that vertical ownership relationships
between cable operators and cable networks reduce competition and
diversity in the marketplace.21 6 However, Congress acknowledged that
vertical relationships in the cable industry have also resulted in significant
benefits.21 7 In particular, the House cited innovative channels including C-
Span, CNN, BET, Nickelodeon, and the Discovery Channel, which "would
not have been feasible without the financial support of cable system
operators."218
While the GAO found little evidence in its 2003 report that license
fees are higher for cable networks owned by either cable operators or
broadcasters, "[t]here was a particular concern.., regarding retransmission
consent agreements., 21 9 License agreements between cable operators and
broadcasters often contain provisions that require MSOs, in lieu of cash
payments, to carry additional cable networks owned by the broadcasters
that they might not otherwise license. 220  For instance, in the 1990s,
television networks such as ABC and NBC included terms in their
broadcast consent agreements requiring cable operators to license their
newly launched affiliated cable networks such as ESPN2 and MSNBC.
221
The GAO reported that retransmission consent agreements can make it
211. Id. at 6165.
212. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(f), 110 Stat. 56, 111
(emphasis added).
213. See Report & Order, supra note 209, at 6168.
214. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 105, at 8211 n.43-44.
215. See id. at 8209 n.31.
216. See id. at 8250.
217. See Second Report & Order, supra note 148, at 8584.
218. See id. (quoting a 1990 House report).
219. GAO, supra note 39, at 29 (emphasis removed) ("using a regression analysis ([the
FCC's] cable license fee model) [the FCC held] constant other factors that could influence the
level of the license fee").
220. Id.
221. See id. at 43.
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difficult for independent networks to gain carriage with cable operators.222
Furthermore, cable operators "were more likely to carry cable networks
that were majority-owned by either cable operators or by broadcasters than
to carry other cable networks. 223  Although it could not find direct
evidence connecting the provisions with higher rates, the GAO concluded
that "rates could be affected by the carriage patterns.,
224
E. A La Carte Pricing and Alternatives
Former Senate Commerce Committee Chairman John McCain and
current FCC Chairman Martin, are long-time advocates for A la carte
pricing.225 Under the proposed system, subscribers would have the choice
to receive and pay only for networks that they want to watch. 26 Industry
representatives argued (and the GAO agreed) that A la carte pricing would
negatively impact the cable industry business model by reducing
advertising revenues; adding costs for new equipment, such as
technologically required addressable converter boxes; and adding customer
and technical service costs to monitor and manage the increased number of
transactions that would occur under an A la carte system.2 27 Furthermore,
even though the GAO found that A la carte cable systems would provide
more individual choices to subscribers, some A la carte customers would
actually pay higher rates.228
In response to inquiries by members of Congress, the Media Bureau
of the FCC released a report in 2004 (First Report) addressing technical,
economic and legal issues relating to "the efficacy of providing [A] la carte
and themed-tier services to cable and satellite subscribers., 229 The Bureau
based its First Report on a six month study where it collected nearly 400
comments, ex parte communications, letters, and testimony.
230
Contributors to the report were cable operators (including Comcast and
Time Warner), DBS providers, program networks, consumer groups,
222. See id.
223. Id. at 5.
224. Id. at 44 (emphasis added).
225. See generally GAO, supra note 39, at 1.
226. Id. at 30. "In fact, a 2000 Nielsen Media Research Report indicated that households
receiving more than 70 networks only watch, on average, about [seventeen] of these networks."
Id. at31.
227. See id. at 32-35.
228. See id. at 30.
229. FCC Media Bureau, Report on the Packaging & Sale of Video Programming Servs. to
the Pub., MB Docket No. 04-207, at 3 (rel. Nov. 18, 2004), available at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-254432A1 .pdf
230. See id. at 5.
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government officials, and consumers. 23' The Bureau concluded that, under
a pure or mandatory A la carte regime, the average household would likely
face a monthly cable rate increase of between fourteen and thirty
232percent. 2 Thus, A la carte would not produce the desired result of
lowering rates for most pay-television households.233 Replying to the
Bureau's report, Senator McCain disappointedly noted, "the industry has
been successful once again in distracting policy makers with a 'parade of
horribles' that they allege would result from a mandatory [A] la carte
offering.
234
However in 2006, the FCC issued a second report (Further Report),
which invalidated most of its First Report, concluding that it "relied on
problematic assumptions and presented incorrect and biased analysis.,
235
In direct contradiction, the Further Report concluded "that [A] la carte could
be in consumers' best interests. 236  The 2006 report also examined
alternatives to pure A la carte pricing, including "mixed bundling," "themed
tiers," and "subscriber-selected tiers.' 237
The current practice of selling cable channels in tiers inevitably gives
consumers more choices. Although there is no clear-cut evidence that the
proposed switch to A la carte pricing would raise cable rates, eliminating
tier-grouping would harm cable subscribers because infant cable networks
would quickly perish without guaranteed carriage. 8  Therefore, tier-
231. See id. at 5 n.5.
232. Id. at 6 (citing the "Booz Allen Hamilton" economic study, which analyzed A la carte's
potential affect on advertising revenue).
233. See id.
234. Frank Ahrens, FCC Says A La Carte TV Would Cost More: Advocates Fault Pricing
Study, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2004, at E01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A63948-2004Novl 9.html (quoting Sen. McCain).
235. FCC Media Bureau, In re A La Carte & Themed Programming & Pricing Options for
Programming Distrib. on Cable Television & Direct Broad. Satellite Syss., Further Report on the
Packaging & Sale of Video Programming Servs. to the Pub., MB Docket No. 04-207, at 3 (rel.
Feb. 9, 2006), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-263740A1 .pdf.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 6 ("In the first alternative, called 'mixed bundling,' multichannel video
programming distributors (MVPDs) would provide all of the digital networks that they currently
carry on an [A] la carte basis, in addition to providing any bundles they choose to offer. Under the
second alternative, MVPDs would introduce one or more additional tiers composed of channels
that are currently being transmitted in digital format and that are related to a particular theme
(such as family friendly programming), so-called 'themed tiers.' Pursuant to the third alternative,
'subscriber-selected tiers,' MVPDs would give consumers the option of buying a small or larger
number of digital networks, where the consumers select the networks from among those available
on the system. In the context of an increasingly competitive MVPD marketplace, presenting such
options should help MVPDs compete for consumers, while enhancing overall consumer
welfare.").
238. GAO, supra note 39, at 36.
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grouping benefits consumers overall by fostering the growth of smaller
channels that cable subscribers might not otherwise select under an A la
carte regime, thereby maintaining diversity in cable programming.239
F. A La Carte and Ownership Developments
Representative Daniel Lipinski, a Democrat from Illinois, co-
sponsored the Family and Consumer Choice Act of 2007 (Family Act),
which includes the current A la carte provision.240 If enacted, the Family
Act would require cable and satellite providers to offer a "family
programming tier, ,24 and issue credits for channels that subscribers elect to
block.242
Concurrent with committee meetings and Family Act debates in the
House, consumers filed an antitrust class action suit in the Central District
of California against major media companies challenging traditional tier
group pricing.243  The putative class members allege, inter alia, that
defendants, including Comcast and Time Warner, force consumers to
acquire channels that they would not otherwise acquire if channels were
offered i la carte.244 Plaintiffs further allege that the bundling practice
violates the Sherman Act by depriving consumers of choice, and results in
significant overcharges.245
Attempting to pressure the cable industry to adopt A la carte pricing,
FCC Chairman Martin announced in November 2007 that the cable
industry crossed over the 70-70 threshold of market dominance, thereby
triggering the FCC's dormant power under the Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984 to ensure competition and diversity through
regulation.246 The National Cable and Telecommunications Association
argued that the FCC lacks authority to impose A la carte pricing.
247
239. See id.
240. Family and Consumer Choice Act of 2007, H.R. 2738, 110th Cong. (2007).
241. Id. § 3(b) (proposing to amend 47 U.S.C. § 522 (2006)) (defining "[f]amily tier of
programming" as including all channels on the expanded basic tier, except those that carry
programs rated TV-14 or TV-MA during designated hours).
242. Id. § 4 (proposing to amend scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
243. See Press Release, Blecher & Collins, P.C., Consumers File Antitrust Class Action
(Sep. 20, 2007), http://www.blechercollins.com/news/cable-suit/index.html.
244. See Class Action Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief for Violations of the
Sherman Antitrust Act at 12, Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc., No. CV-07-06101 (C.D. Cal. Sep.
20, 2007), available at http://www.blechercollins.com/media/cable.pdf.
245. See id. at 14.
246. See William Triplett, Cablers Assail FCC Push for a la Carte, DAILY VARIETY, Nov.
15, 2007, at 4.
247. See id.
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Furthermore, in a letter to Chairman Martin, House Republican leader John
Boehner, from Ohio, said, the 70-70 rule "was not intended to grant the
FCC carte blanche to impose other types of regulation .... Moreover, it
was drafted more than [twenty] years ago as a mechanism to respond to
decreases in sources of content, and that clearly is not a problem today. 248
While it is well established that cable systems offering at least thirty-
six channels are now available in almost 100% of the country, industry
representatives and legislators disagreed with Chairman Martin when he
unilaterally announced that more than seventy percent of those households
actually subscribe to cable. 249 Several independent analyses showed that
the cable industry has not reached the seventy percent threshold.25 ° In fact,
the FCC's own 2006 reports (released after Chairman Martin's
announcement) estimated that the cable subscription rate was between 54%
and 55.2%.251
Under intense pressure from lawmakers, Chairman Martin divulged
where he found the 71.4% rate that he used to determine cable market
dominance.252  However, officials from Warren Communications,
publishers of the annual Television and Cable Factbook, announced that
their calculations did not include all cable operators. 53 Thus, the data was
ill-suited for determining the 70-70 threshold.254 Consumer groups charged
that the cable industry manipulated the data in order to avoid triggering the
threshold, and that the FCC manipulated the data to suit its policy goals.
255
According to FCC Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein, a Democrat,
Chairman Martin attempted "to cook the books" in his report.2 56
Prompted by widespread criticism of the FCC, Representative John
Dingell, a Democrat from Michigan and Chairman of the House Committee
248. William Triplett, Pols Perturbed by Martin, DAILY VARIETY, Nov. 27, 2007, at 24
(quoting a letter from John Boehner, House Republican leader to Kevin J. Martin, FCC
Chairman).
249. See Jim Puzzanghera, FCC May Find It Has the Power to Reregulate Cable, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 13, 2007, at Cl [hereinafter Puzzanghera, FCC May Find]; see also Jim
Puzzanghera, Cable Regulator Bid Delayed, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2007 at C1 [hereinafter
Puzzanghera, Cable Regulator] (discussing the 70-70 threshold of market dominance).
250. See id.
251. See In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for Delivery
of Video Programming, Thirteenth Annual Report, MB Docket No. 06-189, at I (rel. Nov. 27,
2007) (statement of Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-278454A4.pdf.
252. See Puzzanghera, Cable Regulator, supra note 249.
253. See id.
254. See id. (citing officials from Warren Communications News).
255. See Puzzanghera, FCC May Find, supra note 249.
256. Id. (quoting FCC Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein).
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on Energy and Commerce, ordered an FCC inquiry by the Subcommittee
on Oversight and Investigations.257 Congressman Dingell described the
events of late 2007 in a scathing letter to Chairman Martin as a breakdown
in proper procedure. 258  He expressed concern that, by short-circuiting
procedural norms, the FCC was not acting fairly, openly and transparently,
and thus not performing "its core mission: ... to serve the public
interest.259
Bowing to pressure, the FCC extended the deadline for cable
operators to re-submit their market-share data to determine whether the
cable subscription rate is approaching seventy percent.260 Therefore, each
cable operator was required to re-submit its data to the FCC by January 26,
2008 under penalty of perjury.261 Nevertheless, Chairman Martin probably
has enough partisan support in the FCC to further his own political
agenda.262 However, if the FCC imposes an A la carte regulation in 2008,
the likely result will be a challenge by the cable industry in federal
court263 -another clear indication that the failed Telecom Act needs to be
amended.
IV. THE ADELPHIA TRANSACTIONS VIOLATED ANTITRUST LAWS
In June 2002, Adelphia filed for bankruptcy reorganization under
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, after a highly publicized
accounting and looting scandal that ultimately sent its founder, John Rigas,
and his son, Timothy Rigas, to prison.2 64 On May 18, 2005, Comcast and
Time Warner filed applications with the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) 265 to acquire most of the cable systems owned or
257. See Letter from John D. Dingell, Chairman, U.S. House of Rep., Comm. on Energy &
Commerce, to Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, FCC, at 1 (Dec. 3, 2007), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/PressI 10/110-1tr. 120307.FCC.Martin.transparency.pdf.
258. See id.
259. See id. at 1-2.
260. See In re Extension of Time to File Comments & Reply Comments on the Review of
the Comm'n's Program Access Rules & Examination of Programming Tying Arrangements, Pub.
Notice, MB Docket No. 07-198, at 2 (rel. Nov. 20, 2007), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DA-07-4688A 1 .pdf.
261. See Press Release, FCC, FCC Adopts 13th Annual Report to Congress on Video
Competition & Notice of Inquiry for the 14th Annual Report (Nov. 27, 2007) (on file with FCC),
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-278454A I.pdf.
262. See Jim Puzzanghera, Tribune Future Hinges on FCC, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2007, at
Cl.
263. See id.
264. See Peter Grant & James Bandler, Time Warner, Comcast Weigh Bid for Adelphia,
WALL ST. J., Sep. 28, 2004, at B 1.
265. Applications were filed pursuant to sections 214 and 3 10(d) of the Communications
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managed by co-applicant Adelphia.266 Comcast and Time Warner also
proposed to swap unrelated cable systems between themselves in order to
consolidate their markets.267 For instance, Comcast proposed to transfer its
market share in Los Angeles, Dallas, and Cleveland in exchange for Time
Warner's market share in Philadelphia-Comcast's home-base.268
Cable television is technically not a monopolistic market, but rather
an oligopolistic market because a few firms account for a majority of the
sales rather than only one. 269 However, as a result of the transactions,
Comcast and Time Warner were able to create individual regional
monopolies in many key markets including New York, Los Angeles, and
Washington, D.C.-the financial, entertainment, and political capitals of
the United States. 7°
A. Applications, Petitions, and Comments
After Comcast, Time Warner and Adelphia (collectively
"Applicants") filed their applications, the FCC collected public comments
and invited those with "party-in-interest" standing to file petitions to deny
the transactions. 27 1 The FCC collected over 26,000 informal comments and
recognized certain interested parties 272 who submitted sworn declarations
pursuant to the Communications Act of 1934 (Communications Act) 273 and
FCC regulations. 74 The FCC classified opposition groups such as Free
Press as "parties-in-interest" based upon their specific factual allegations
that granting the applications "would be prima facie inconsistent with the
public interest.
275
In order to obtain FCC approval for the asset acquisitions and
transfers (collectively "Adelphia Transactions"), the Applicants had the
burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the
proposed transactions would serve the "public interest, convenience and
necessity. '276 The FCC evaluated the "public interest" factor by weighing
Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 214, 310(d) (2000).
266. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 105, at 8205, 8206, 8214.
267. See id. at 8212-13.
268. See id. at 8213.
269. See Posner, supra note 41, at 559.
270. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 105, at 8251.
271. See id. at 8214-15.
272. See id. at 8214-16.
273. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1) (2000).
274. See 47 C.F.R. § 78.22 (2000).
275. Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 105, at 8215-16.
276. Id. at 8207.
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potential harms against potential benefits. 277  The fact-specific inquiries
were rooted in the "broad aims of the Communications Act," as amended
by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Telecom Act), including
preserving and enhancing competition in relevant markets; accelerating
private sector deployment of advanced services; and ensuring diversity of
information sources and services to the public. 278 The FCC also considered
the nature, complexity, and speed of technological and market changes, as
well as overall trends within the communications industry. 279 The FCC
based its competitive analysis on antitrust principles and regulatory policies
that govern the interactions of cable operators.280
At the outset, the FCC recognized that the "transaction[s] may lead to
both beneficial and harmful consequences.,, 281 For instance, consolidating
assets may allow the cable operators to reduce transaction costs and offer
new products, but it may also enhance barriers to market entry by
overbuilders 82 The FCC also evaluated the transactions pursuant to the
thirty percent horizontal ownership limit.283  Based on the FCC's
calculations, Comcast's post-transaction subscribership would consist of
28.7% of all multichannel video programming distributors' (MVPDs)
subscribers in the United States, thereby comporting with the thirty percent
horizontal rule.284
The FCC also noted that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
approved both the acquisition of Adelphia and the related swap agreements
on January 31, 2006.285 According to the U.S. Department of Justice and
the FTC, the Sherman Act forbids mergers and acquisitions if they
constitute a "contract, combination ... or conspiracy in restraint of
trade. 28 6 The Clayton Act also prohibits mergers and acquisitions if their
effect may "substantially ... lessen competition, or ... tend to create a
277. See id. at 8217.
278. See id. at 8218 (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 521(6), 521(4), 532(a) (2000);
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 706, 110 Stat. 56, 118-119).
279. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 105, at 8218.
280. See id.
281. Id. at 8219.
282. See id.
283. See id. at 8225 (citing Second Report & Order, supra note 148, at 8567); see also
discussion supra Part III.A.
284. See id. at 8231 ("MVPD subscribers" include those that subscribe to cable service and
those that subscribe to Direct Broadcast Satellite service.).
285. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 105, at 8216-17.
286. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES, § 0 (1992) [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES] (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 1 (2000)).
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monopoly. 287 The FTC concluded "that the proposed transactions were
unlikely to substantially lessen competition in any geographic region in the
United States. 88
B. Potential Harms
Petitioners opposing the Adelphia Transactions argued that the
proposed system swaps between Comcast and Time Warner would reduce
competition in the cable industry by deterring overbuilders from entering
the market.2 89 The Applicants rebutted the petitioners' arguments by citing
competitive pressures from Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) providers and
290emerging competition from telephone companies.
The FCC evaluated "potential harms" in relation to horizontal and
vertical integration concerns, 29 1 noting "that antitrust law and economic
analysis have viewed vertical transactions more favorably than horizontal
transactions. 292 Vertical transactions "do not directly reduce the number
of competitors;" whereas, horizontal transactions directly concentrate
market share.293  However, while vertical transactions may allow for
greater efficiencies, a vertically integrated cable company that competes in
upstream and downstream markets may prevent rivals from licensing
"essential" channels or may unreasonably overcharge for carriage rights.294
Opponents to the Adelphia Transactions argued that Comcast's
vertical integration is particularly harmful to consumers and overbuilders in
Philadelphia and Chicago,295 where Comcast controls the cable markets and
296several sports entertainment interests. For instance, Comcast controls a
majority interest in the National Hockey League's Philadelphia Flyers, the
National Basketball Association's Philadelphia 76ers, and Philadelphia's
287. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000)).
288. Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 105, at 8219 (citing the statement of
Chairman Majoras, Commissioner Kavacic, and Commissioner Rosch Concerning the Closing of
the Investigation Into Transactions Involving Comcast, Time Warner, and Adelphia
Communications, File No. 051-0151, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/ftc/050151 twadelphiamajoras.kovacic-rosch.pdf (Jan. 31, 2006)).
289. See id. at 8238.
290. See id. at 8244.
291. See id. at 8237.
292. Id. at 8238.
293. See id. at 8238.
294. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 105, at 8238, 8256-57.
295. See Third Amended Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Sherman Antitrust
Act, supra note 4, at 1-4.
296. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 105, at 8262.
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two major indoor sports arenas.297 It also owns majority interests in
Comcast SportsNet Philadelphia and Comcast SportsNet Chicago-
regional sports networks (RSNs) that exclusively air a significant number
of games in their respective cities.298
Historically, the FCC has classified regional professional sports
programming as "essential" or "must have" for distributors and
subscribers. 299 Thus, the FCC weighs a lack of RSNs' availability more
heavily than a lack of non-essential channels because consumers value
local sports programming more than other cable content. 300 According to
the FCC, "there is no readily acceptable substitute" for RSNs, because
cable subscribers cannot change the channel to watch their favorite local
sports teams.30 1 Therefore, in its evaluation of the Adelphia agreements,
the FCC found that the Adelphia Transactions may ultimately increase "the
likelihood of harm in markets" where Comcast or Time Warner hold an
ownership interest in regional sports networks by increasing retail prices
for consumers and limiting consumer choice.302
Specifically, the FCC found that the Adelphia Transactions might
enable Comcast and Time Warner to engage in anticompetitive behavior in
cities such as Chicago and Philadelphia through "stealth discrimination"
and foreclosure of RSN programming.30 3 Therefore, the FCC imposed
remedial conditions on the Adelphia Transactions.30 4  The FCC required
that Comcast and Time Warner "refrain from engaging in specific unfair
practices," and offer their RSNs "to all MVPDs on a non-exclusive basis
and on nondiscriminatory terms and conditions.' 3°5  Furthermore, "[f]or
enforcement purposes, aggrieved MVPDs may bring program access
297. See Third Amended Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Sherman Antitrust
Act, supra note 4, at 28; see also Deni Kasrel, Comcast: High Hopes for Sports, PHILA. Bus. J.,
Aug. 29, 1997, http://philadelphia.bizjoumals.com/philadelphia/stories/l997/09/01l/story2.html.
298. See Third Amended Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Sherman Antitrust
Act, supra note 4, at 29.
299. See In re Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Prot. & Competition Act
of 1992; Development of Competition & Diversity in Video Programming Distribution: Section
628(c)(5) of the Commc'ns Act; Sunset of Exclusive Contract Prohibition, Report & Order, 17
F.C.C.R. 12124, 12149, 12156 (rel. June 28, 2002) [hereinafter Sunset of Exclusive Contract
Prohibition]; see also Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 105, at 8227.
300. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 105, at 8279.
301. See Sunset of Exclusive Contract Prohibition, supra note 299, at 12149.
302. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 105, at 8256.
303. See id. at 826 1.
304. See id. at 8207.
305. Id. at 8274 (prohibition against exclusivity contracts codified at 47 C.F.R. 76.1002(c)
(2007)). On October 4, 2007, the FCC extended its non-exclusivity provision through 2012. See
Specific Unfair Practices Prohibited, 72 Fed. Reg. 56,661 (Oct. 4, 2007) (to be codified at 47
C.F.R. § 76.1002).
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complaints against Comcast and Time Warner ... using the [arbitration]
procedures set forth in the Commission's program access rules.
30 6
In opposition to the Adelphia agreements, the petitioners and
commenters argued that the transactions were "intended to eliminate head-
to-head competition between Time Warner and Comcast in the country's
most desirable [markets]. 30 7  To evaluate the Adelphia Transactions'
horizontal effects, the petitioners argued that the FCC should use the
Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index (HHI) to analyze the competitive effects of
the transactions. 308  The HHI accounts for the number of firms in the
market and the degree of inequality among firms' market shares.30 9 Based
on the commenters' HHI calculations, the proposed increases in national
and regional cable market concentration were sufficient to raise
competitive concerns.310
The index was "designed for application to industries where
participants compete directly., 31 However, the FCC refuses to apply HHI
calculations in horizontal concentration analyses unless the companies in
question compete at a national level. 312  Although Comcast and Time
Warner theoretically compete nationally for advertising and market share,
they do not compete locally because they control non-overlapping, non-
competing regions.313 When the FCC evaluates competition in the cable
distribution market, it uses "the household" as the relevant geographic
measuring unit.314 Therefore, using "the household" as a benchmark,
Comcast and Time Warner argued that the Adelphia Transactions could not
possibly reduce the level of competition because they did not directly
306. Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 105, at 8274 (arbitration procedures
codified at 47 C.F.R. § 76.1003 (2007)).
307. Id. at 8239 (citing Free Press Petition at 9, Rose Decl. at 11-13).
308. See id. at 8240 (noting that the DOJ and FTC often use the HHI).
309. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 286, § 1.5 ("The HHI is calculated by
summing the squares of the individual market shares of all the participants... reflect[ing] both
the distribution of the market shares of the top four firms and the composition of the market
outside the top four firms.").
310. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 105, at 8242.
311. In re Implementation of Section 11 of the Cable Television Consumer Prot. &
Competition Act of 1992; Implementation of Cable Act Reform Provisions of the Telecomms.
Act of 1996; The Comm'n's Cable Horizontal & Vertical Ownership Limits & Attribution Rules;
Review of the Comm'n's Regulations Governing Attribution of Broad. & Cable/MDS Interests;
Review of the Comm'n's Regulations & Policies Affecting Inv. in the Broad. Indus.;
Reexamination of the Comm'n's Cross-Interest Policy, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
16 F.C.C.R. 17312, 17342 (rel. Sep. 21, 2001) [hereinafter Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking].
312. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 105, at 8244.
313. See id. at 8242; see also WEXLER, supra note 8, at 11-12.
314. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 105, at 8242.
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compete before the proposed transactions.315  In other words, the
Applicants persuaded the FCC that there was little risk of lessening
competition in the cable industry through the Adelphia Transactions
because consumers never had a choice between cable operators.1 6
The FCC observed that incumbent cable operators partially derive
their local market power from their national size.3t 7 Multiple cable system
operators (MSOs) are then able to leverage their local market power on an
inter-market basis and thus, have the ability to take anticompetitive actions
against programmers or overbuilders.318 In 2001, the FCC considered
using the HHI to measure national market power in the cable industry.319
Furthermore, as recently as 2006, the FCC found that the HHI was a
"useful tool to follow trends" in MVPD concentration from year to year.320
However, despite its own continued endorsement of HHI calculations in
other proceedings, the FCC quickly dismissed the commenters' HHI
calculations in its evaluation of the Adelphia Transactions.32'
The FCC also dismissed a strong argument made by Marco Island
Cable (MIC), a private overbuilder in Florida.32  MIC alleged that
Comcast and Time Warner directly competed for customers in two Florida
counties prior to the Adelphia Transactions.323 Therefore, the proposed
transfer of Time Warner's facilities in Collier and Lee Counties would
diminish head-to-head competition.324 However, the MSO Applicants
argued that the Adelphia proceeding was an improper forum to address the
petitioner's arguments given that MIC's antitrust claims were pending in a
Florida federal court.
325
Marco Island Cable, Inc. v. Comcast Cablevision of the South, Inc.,
originally filed in January 2004, has been a lengthy and intensely litigated
case, focusing on exclusivity agreements between condominium
associations and cable operators.326 The court found in favor of defendant
315. See id.
316. See id.
317. See Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 311, at 17343.
318. See id. at 17342-43.
319. Id. at 17342.
320. See Twelfth Annual Report, supra note 103, at 2573-74.
321. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 105, at 8241-42.
322. See id. at 8247.
323. See id. at 8244-45.
324. See id. at 8247.
325. See id. at 8245.
326. See Marco Island Cable, Inc. v. Comcast Cablevision of the South, Inc., No. 2:04-CV-
26-FTM-29DNF, slip op. at I (M.D. Fla. May 16, 2007), available at 2007 WL 1455937; see
also Marco Island Cable, Inc. v. Comcast Cablevision of the South, Inc., No. 2:04-CV-26-FTM-
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Comcast on several of plaintiff MIC's claims at the summary judgment
stage, holding that under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, Comcast was
immunized from antitrust liability because of its litigation-related
conduct.327 Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, a defendant is immune
from Sherman Act liability if the defendant has made concerted efforts to
petition the government to pass legislation to restrain or monopolize trade
in its favor.328 Defendants who petition through administrative or judicial
proceedings are also immune from liability.329
In Marco Island Cable, the court held that because Comcast had filed
a previous lawsuit against Cozumel Condominium Association and sent
letters threatening to sue others to enforce its exclusivity contracts, it had
engaged in conduct that immunized it from antitrust liability.330 However,
a jury eventually found in favor of plaintiff MIC on its remaining claims
under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA).
331
Apparently, the jury wanted to send a message to Comcast. MIC was
awarded $3.26 million in damages, which was over two million dollars
more than the plaintiff overbuilder requested in its case-in-chief.
3 2
However, the court found the damages excessive and ordered a new trial.333
The court held that even though "a reasonable jury could find that Comcast
committed acts prohibited by [the] FDUTPA," the jury's $3.26 million
award was "grossly excessive and shock[ed] the conscience. 334
In its evaluation of the Adelphia Transactions, the FCC concluded
that the potential anticompetitive conduct alleged by MIC was
"[in] sufficient to create a material risk of public interest harm., 335 Despite
acknowledging that opposing arguments were relevant, the FCC deferred to
the Florida district court to assess MIC's specific claims and deferred to its
own cable ownership proceeding to dismiss other arguments.336 Illustrating
29DNF, 2006 WL 1814333, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jul. 3, 2006) (ordering a new trial).
327. See Marco Island Cable, 2006 WL 1814333, at *10.
328. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136
(1961); see also United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965).
329. See Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Elan Corp., PLC, 421 F.3d 1227, 1233 (1lth Cir. 2005)
(citing Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972)).
330. See Marco Island Cable, 2006 WL 1814333, at *9*10.
331. See Marco Island Cable, Inc. v. Comcast Cablevision of the S., Inc., No. 2:04-CV-26-
FTM-29DNF, slip op. at I (M.D. Fla. May 16, 2007), available at 2007 WL 1455937.
332. See id. at 1.
333. See id. at 3.
334. Id. at 2-3.
335. Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 105, at 8247.
336. See id. at 8246, 8293. The Cable ownership proceeding concluded on Dec. 18, 2007
without specifically addressing MIC's claims. See generally Martin Press Release, supra note
156, at 6.
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the FCC's recurring habit of inaction and delay, the FCC generally ignored
MIC's claims, and instead encouraged parties alleging specific claims of
anticompetitive pricing to follow FCC complaint filing procedures or seek
redress in court.337
When Congress empowered the FCC to oversee the cable industry,
legislators did not intend for the regulatory group to re-assign its
responsibilities to the over-crowded court system. Moreover, judicial
proceedings are not well-adapted to sifting through complex financial data
to resolve sophisticated economic issues such as the web of swap
agreements within the Adelphia Transactions.338
C. Potential Benefits
The FCC believed that Applicants met their required burden by
showing that the Adelphia Transactions would result in a significant
number of public interest benefits that outweighed potential harms. 339 For
instance, Comcast and Time Warner argued that the proposed transactions
would accelerate deployment of advanced services, such as Voice over
Internet Protocol telephone service (VoIP), high-speed Internet, and Video
on Demand programming; 340 facilitate the resolution of the Adelphia
bankruptcy proceeding; 341 and enhance competition and achieve pro-
consumer efficiencies by clustering their respective cable systems.342 The
FCC assessed potential benefits based on the following criteria: (1) the
transactions must likely accomplish the claimed benefits; (2) the evidence
offered by Applicants must be verifiable and non-speculative; and (3) the
benefits must flow to consumers.343
In support of their benefit claims, Comcast and Time Warner flexed
their financial muscles. The Applicants detailed their projected collective
$800 million investment to upgrade Adelphia's systems.344 Their sales-
pitch cited past accomplishments in economic terms in order to prove their
future financial commitment.345 For example, "Comcast spent nearly $8
billion to upgrade systems it acquired from AT&T Broadband in 2002.' '346
337. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 105, at 8246.
338. See Posner, supra note 41, at 629.
339. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 105, at 8207.
340. See id. at 8307.
341. See id. at 8207.
342. See id. at 8315-16.
343. See id. at 8307-08.
344. See id. at 8311.
345. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 105, at 8308.
346. Id.
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In 1991, Time Warner "was the first MSO to complete a digital upgrade of
all of its cable systems," and has invested a total of five billion dollars since
1411996.
34
The FCC found that the Adelphia Transactions were likely to
accelerate the deployment of advanced services because MSOs have the
incentive to compete with new services provided by telephone
companies. 348 Furthermore, the FCC concluded that benefits would likely
flow to Adelphia customers after the transactions because Comcast and
Time Warner were financially committed.349
The Applicants also argued that approving the transactions would
resolve the complicated Adelphia bankruptcy proceedings, thereby
maximizing recovery to creditors. 350 The FCC concluded that resolution of
the bankruptcy proceedings would provide a public service benefit by
compensating creditors and avoiding "expense[s] associated with arranging
an alternative disposition of Adelphia's assets.' 35 1 However in doing so, it
valued the benefit less than it might have if the swap agreements were not
included in the proposal.352 The FCC noted that by swapping assets,
Comcast and Time Warner requested approval for "purposes unrelated to
the Adelphia bankruptcy proceeding. 353 Thus, potential benefits flowing
from its resolution were only tangentially related to the swap agreements.354
Comcast and Time Warner insisted that the proposed swap
agreements would lead to several public interest benefits, yet they failed to
show how the alleged benefits would flow to consumers.355 For instance,
Applicants claimed that by further clustering their cable systems they
would be better positioned to effectively compete against DBS providers
and telephone companies.356 Furthermore, the location of Applicants' cable
systems provided a unique opportunity for Comcast and Time Warner to
achieve efficiencies and increase rollout of advanced services. 357 Lastly,
Applicants argued that they would be able to advertise more efficiently,
thereby improving cable penetration rates.
35 8
347. Id.
348. See id. at 8315.
349. See id. at 8315.
350. See id. at 8321.
351. Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 105, at 8324.
352. See id. at 8324.
353. Id.
354. See id. at 8321.
355. See id. at 8315.
356. See id.
357. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 105, at 8316.
358. See id. at 8316
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The FCC dismissed most of the benefits that Comcast and Time
Warner projected would flow from their clustering practices because the
evidence that they submitted was both speculative and insufficient.
35 9
Moreover, lower costs associated with clustering "are not.., passed along
to subscribers in the form of lower monthly rates. 3 60  Therefore, the
possibility that Comcast and Time Warner could improve their own cost
structures through efficient advertising and marketing were considered
irrelevant to the FCC.361 However, reiterating its earlier analysis, the FCC
found one narrow benefit that would flow to Adelphia customers-rapid
deployment of advanced services such as cable delivered telephone service
or VoIP and local Video on Demand.362
D. The FCC Approval and Conditions Imposed
The FCC employed a sliding scale approach to weigh potential public
interest harms against benefits.363 Thus, the evaluation considered degrees
of likelihood and magnitude.364 However, despite significant evidence put
forth by interested parties showing that the proposed transactions may lead
to anticompetitive harms, the FCC concluded that the Adelphia
Transactions "would serve the public interest, convenience, and
necessity. '365 The FCC granted the applications, along with specific,
366narrowly-tailored conditions. For instance, Comcast and Time Warner
were required to certify compliance with the FCC's "cable/SMATV cross-
ownership rule' 367 within sixty days.368 However, at press time, the MSOs
had not certified total compliance despite the FCC granting several
369extensions.
359. See id. at 8318-19.
360. Id. at 8318 (quoting commenter DIRECTV).
361. See id. at 8319.
362. See id. at 8327.
363. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 105, at 8327.
364. See id. at 8327.
365. Id. at 8328.
366. See id. at 8219.
367. 47 C.F.R. § 76.501(d), (e) (2007) (explaining that the "cable/SMATV cross-ownership
rule" prohibits cable operators from offering satellite master antenna television service separate
and apart from any franchised cable service in any portion of a franchise area served by the cable
operator or its affiliates, unless the service is offered in accordance with the terms of a cable
franchise agreement).
368. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 105, at 8233.
369. See Order Granting Further Extension of Time, supra note 112, at 16940-41.
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E. Antitrust Analysis of the Adelphia Transactions
Even though the FCC suggested that it would evaluate the Adelphia
Transactions in light of antitrust principles, after it dismissed the
petitioners' HHI calculations, consideration of antitrust law was notably
absent from the FCC's Memorandum Opinion and Order.370 According to
the FCC, the swap agreements were "tangential" to the transfer of
Adelphia's assets.371  Yet, they also appear to violate the Sherman and
Clayton Antitrust Acts. However, because Comcast and Time Warner are
accomplished monopolists, they are able to cloak their anticompetitive
conduct so that opponents are unable to prove actual evidence of dramatic
anticompetitive behavior.372
The swap agreements between Comcast and Time Warner were per se
violations of the Sherman Act because they were contracts inherently
designed to restrain trade and eliminate competition for individual
households (the FCC's relevant measuring unit).373 Furthermore, by
clustering their cable systems through swap agreements, the MSOs
monopolized the relevant markets.3 74
The FCC noted that the Adelphia Transactions may increase the
likelihood of harm in regions where Comcast and Time Warner also own
Regional Sports Networks (RSNs). 375  Therefore, in Philadelphia, where
Comcast owns the local cable sports channel, the swap agreements should
not have been approved because the exchange violates the Horizontal
Merger Guidelines376 and the Clayton Act. 377  Furthermore, the FCC's
arbitration provision, which was intended to prevent RSN foreclosure by
Comcast and Time Warner, is a useless remedial measure for
overbuilders in Philadelphia because antitrust claims are already pending in
370. See generally Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 105, at 8242-8333.
371. See id. at 8324.
372. See Posner, supra note 41, at 603.
373. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000); see also Behrend v. Comcast Corp., Nos. 03-6604, 07-218,
07-219, slip op. at 1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2007), available at 2007 WL 2221415 (determining "that
the per se rule applie[s] to the swap agreements because they allegedly constituted horizontal
market allocations").
374. See Posner, supra note 41, at 588-89 ("One could argue that the implicit threat of
predatory conduct, even if never implemented or implemented so sporadically as to escape
detection, should be enough to keep competitors in line and give the firm that monopolizes other
markets considerable market power in the competitive market, although not a complete
monopoly.").
375. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 105, at 8326.
376. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 286, § 1.5.
377. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000).
378. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 105, at 8274-75.
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Federal court.
3 79
F. Proper Pleading for Antitrust Claims in Federal Court
Among the named plaintiffs in a pending antitrust claim against
Comcast is overbuilder RCN Telecom Services, Inc. (RCN)38°-one of the
commenters who opposed the Adelphia Transactions. 38' The court has
certified two separate classes in Behrend v. Comcast Corp.: the
"Philadelphia cluster" and the "Chicago cluster." 382  At press time, the
motion to certify the putative Boston class had not been considered.383 All
three cases, while related to separate FCC-approved swap agreements,
involved similar alleged antitrust violations by Comcast.384 Therefore, the
cases were consolidated into one proceeding in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.385 The plaintiffs' suit survived motions to dismiss and a
motion for a judgment on the pleadings386 after the Supreme Court
redefined its pleading standard for antitrust claims in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly.387 Thus, the class action complaint contained "enough factual
matter (taken as true) to suggest that" Comcast and Time Warner made an
illegal agreement, and "raise[d] a reasonable expectation that discovery
will reveal evidence of [an] illegal agreement., 388 In other words, the facts
alleged regarding the cable operators' parallel conduct were suggestive
enough to show that a Sherman Act conspiracy was "plausible.
3 89
Plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that "[a]s a result of.. . unlawful swap
agreements" between Comcast and Time Warner (and previous FCC-
approved swaps), Comcast's "actual and potential competitors were
removed from the Philadelphia and Chicago clusters and defendants were
able to exclude actual and potential competitors from, and raise prices
379. See Behrend v. Comcast Corp., Nos. 03-6604, 07-218, 07-219, slip op. at 1 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 1, 2007), available at 2007 WL 2221415.
380. See id. at 5 n.6.
381. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 105, at 8239.
382. See Behrend, No. 03-6604, slip op. at I (E.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2007), available at 2007 WL
2972601.
383. See Behrend, Nos. 03-6604, 07-218, 07-219, slip op. at 1 n.1.
384. See Behrend, No. 03-6604, slip op. at 1.
385. See Behrend v. Comeast Corp., Nos. 03-6604, 07-218, 07-219, slip op. at 1 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 1, 2007), available at 2007 WL 2221415.
386. See id.
387. See Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007).
388. Behrend, Nos. 03-6604, 07-218, 07-219, slip op. at 5 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S.
Ct. at 1965).
389. Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1965).
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within, the Philadelphia and Chicago clusters., 390  Furthermore, Comcast
engaged in conduct preventing competition in Philadelphia when it initially
denied plaintiff RCN access to Comcast SportsNet Philadelphia.39'
Although Comcast eventually granted RCN transmission rights on a short-
term basis, 392  the plaintiffs alleged that "Comcast ... substantially
interfered with RCN's access to contractors needed by RCN to build and
offer competing cable television services in [the] Philadelphia cluster."
393
Furthermore, Comcast allegedly "prevented, or attempted to prevent, key
contractors ... from doing business with RCN by entering into or
enforcing non-compete clauses ... and threaten[ed] contractors with loss of
work., 394  The combined cases appear to be headed for litigation.
However, several of the claims could have been averted if the FCC had not
approved the swap agreements.
In a separate suit filed in the District of Minnesota against Time
Warner and Comcast, 395 plaintiff America Channel, who was denied
certification as a "party-in-interest" petitioner in the Adelphia
396 13dnieproceeding, was also denied a trial in court.397 Unlike the Behrend court,
the America Channel court dismissed the plaintiffs antitrust claims based
on the Bell Atlantic pleading standard. 398 This ruling is currently being
appealed by America Channel.399
Based on FCC findings and allegations put forth by plaintiffs in
Behrend and America Channel, swap agreements are harmful to
overbuilders. °° Clustering is beneficial to MSOs, but detrimental to
390. Third Amended Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act,
supra note 4, at 22.
391. See id. at29.
392. See id. at 28-30, 33.
393. Id. at 30.
394. Id.
395. See Am. Channel, LLC v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., No. 06-2175 (DWF/SRN), slip op.
at 1, 7 (D. Minn. June 28, 2007), available at 2007 WL 1892227.
396. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, supra note 105, at 8216 (referring to The America
Channel as "TAC," the FCC stated that "the pleadings filed by... TAC fail[ed] to meet the
requirements of section 309(d)(1) because [the] group [did not] attach[] a sworn statement as
required by statute. Thus, [the FCC] conclude[d] that... TAC [was] appropriately treated as [an]
informal objector[] in the ... proceeding pursuant to Commission Rule 1.41").
397. See Am. Channel, No. 06-2175 (DWF/SRN), slip op. at 7.
398. See id. at 3, 7.
399. See Notice of Appeal, Am. Channel, LLC v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., No. 06-2175
(DWF/SRN) (D. Minn. July 9, 2007) (Notice signed by the plaintiff's attorney, Daniel R.
Shulman, stating, "Notice is hereby given that The America Channel, LLC, Plaintiff... hereby
appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit from this Court's
Memorandum Opinion and Order dated June 28, 2007 and Judgment entered July 2, 2007.").
400. See discussion supra Parts IV.B, E.
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competition-especially in markets where cable operators own regional
sports networks. 40 1 Therefore, Congress should impose heightened scrutiny
on future mergers and acquisitions involving swap agreements. When the
FCC and FTC consider future agreements, there should be a legal
presumption that the swap agreements are prima facie inconsistent with the
Sherman and Clayton Acts. Therefore, MSOs requesting approval for
swap agreements should have the burden to show that there is a compelling
public interest in approving the agreements, and the compelling public
interest cannot be accomplished through any less anticompetitive means.
Heightened scrutiny by the FCC and FTC should protect overbuilders and
consumers against anticompetitive clustering practices, thereby easing the
burden on the courts.
V. CONCLUSION
The failed deregulatory Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Telecom
Act) is at the root of many legal issues in the cable industry. However, re-
regulation is not the best solution. In the interest of forward thinking, it
would be illogical and inefficient for Congress to completely rewrite the
Telecom Act. Satellite television providers and telephone companies are
beginning to provide some regional competition to the cable industry.40 2
Furthermore, history has shown that lawmakers have trouble analyzing and
interpreting data to set limits that accurately reflect competitive
conditions.40 3 However, given the Telecom Act's unworkable structure-
evidenced by the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC) inability to
implement its provisions to the satisfaction of the courts-it is time for
Congress to consider alternative solutions.
In 1969, the cable industry was in its infancy. Judge Richard A.
Posner-considered an expert in the area of legal economics404--published
401. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
402. See discussion supra Part III.A.
403. See discussion supra Part III.A; see also Posner, supra note 41, at 629 (discussing "the
institutional limitations ofjudicial and administrative processes").
404. "Following his graduation from Harvard Law School, Judge Posner clerked for Justice
William J. Brennan Jr. From 1963-65, he was assistant to Commissioner Philip Elman of the
Federal Trade Commission. For the next two years he was assistant to the solicitor general of the
United States. Prior to going to Stanford Law School in 1968 as associate professor, Judge
Posner served as general counsel of the President's Task Force on Communications Policy. He
first came to ... the [University of Chicago] Law School [faculty] in 1969, and was Lee and
Brena Freeman Professor of Law prior to his appointment in 1981 as a judge of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. He was the chief judge of the court from 1993 to 2000."
Richard Posner, [Faculty], The Law School, Univ. of Chicago Website,
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-r/ (providing a brief biography of Judge Posner)
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his theoretical Comment on the regulation of natural monopolies.0 5 Judge
Posner suggested then (and re-affirmed thirty years later) that the natural
monopoly's inherent disposition toward consolidation makes common
carrier regulation unlikely to bring about competitive pricing.40 6
Overwhelmingly, regulators are "ignorant of the principles of
economics. 40 7 Furthermore, their staffs are exposed to strong pressures
from special-interest groups because regulatory commissions such as the
FCC are required to be intimately involved in the affairs of the industries
that they regulate.40 8 From an ethical standpoint, regulators are unable to
distinguish between companies who extract large profits through lawful
efficiency and those who profit because they are natural monopolies.40 9
Additionally, Judge Posner cited two primary arguments against regulation
of natural monopolies: (1) regulators lack information and incentive, and
(2) regulated firms often neutralize regulation or "bend it to their
advantage.,
410
Therefore, Congress and the FCC should consider scrapping arbitrary
horizontal ownership caps and their "effective competition" classification.
Instead, the FCC can strike a bargain with the cable industry whereby
excess-profits taxes (or so-called "luxury taxes") will be used as a
substitute for regulation. As Judge Posner pointed out:
[a] tax would minimize the disincentive and other perverse
effects of profit regulation ... because it would permit the
regulated firm to keep a substantial portion of any profits it
could make. At the same time, the tax would require the
regulated firm to divide its monopoly profits with the public.
411
Luxury taxes would provide two primary benefits: (1) a steady
revenue stream for local municipalities to use for public purposes, and (2) a
way to level the playing field between video distributors that has fewer
(last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
405. See Posner, supra note 41. Although Judge Posner wrote his article before cable
television became a common commodity, he correctly predicted that the cable industry "may
have sufficient natural monopoly characteristics to invite extension of the regulatory principle to
them." Posner, supra note 41, at 549.
406. See RICHARD A. POSNER, NATURAL MONOPOLY AND ITS REGULATION, at vii (Cato
Inst. ed., 1999) (1969) (noting that regulation of natural monopolies "is more likely to produce
distortions than to bring about a reasonable simulacrum of competitive pricing and output").
407. Posner, supra note 41, at 623.
408. See id. at 624.
409. See id. at 563.
410. POSNER, supra note 406, at vii.
411. Posner, supra note 41, at 639-40.
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undesirable side effects than rate-ceilings.4t2
Comcast should be familiar with luxury tax provisions given its vast
financial interests in the sports world.413 Similar economic structures have
been implemented in professional sports to maintain a level playing field in
the form of salary caps and luxury taxes. For instance, in Major League
Baseball, some teams that benefit from greater market share are required to
redirect revenue to smaller market teams to balance league competition.
414
The level at which the teams are "taxed" for their market share was pre-
determined and mutually agreed upon through collective bargaining.41 5
However, if a luxury tax is applied to the cable industry, excess profits will
not be redistributed to the competition (as it is in Major League Baseball).
Instead, the money would flow directly to the public-where it belongs.
FCC Chairman Martin appears to appreciate a good sports analogy.
In December 2007, responding to widespread criticism, he shifted blame to
others, comparing his efforts to a football player trying to cross the goal
line as the goal posts were moved.416 In fact, sports analogies are quite
appropriate under the current circumstances in the cable industry. In
professional sports, balanced competition leads to a better overall product
for consumers. Similarly, in the cable industry, greater competition leads
to lower prices for consumers and a wider range of choices. Therefore,
Congress and the FCC should end the debate on regulation, set politics
aside and call it a tie with the cable industry by considering a luxury tax.
The regulation debate has been extended for too many extra innings.
Gary Wax*
412. See id. at 640.
413. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
414. See, e.g., Stefan Fatsis, Baseball Pact Is Ratified By Owners, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27,
1996, at A3.
415. See id.
416. See Martin Press Release, supra note 156, at 6.
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